

Speaking-in-the-last-instance: Non-Standard Usage, Superposition, and the (H)interlinguistic State

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IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE to begin by thinking about what might be termed the “positionality” of the present paper with respect to the non-standard materials that it would seek to rework. These introductory remarks, then, refer both to the very possibility of “introducing” non-philosophy¹, and more broadly, to the possibility of analysing, transforming, or experimenting upon non-standard materials, that the “simple” materials out of which non-philosophy is composed should not be returned of that pernicious speculation in the fabrics of this presentation. We are concerned to refrain from perpetuating, as a matter, and at the level, of our discussion, that which has been “defined and specified” across the undulatory movement of Laruelle’s project. In other words, it is crucial that a rigorous fidelity is maintained to the discoveries of non-philosophy – that, for instance, the auto-positioning of philosophy is opposed – in any attempt to observe, “articulate” of, or remobilise, those discoveries³. Crucially, then, this notion implies an intimate connection, a material imbrication, of a content and its application, of theory and its practice, that demonstrates the foundations of a new kind of textual analysis adequate and faithful to non-standard resources.

1. For detailed discussion concerning introductions to non-philosophy, see Ó MAOILEARCA John, Circumventing the Problem of Initiation: On Introductions to Non-Philosophy”, in GANGLE ROCCO, GREVE Julius (eds.), *Superpositions. Laruelle and the Humanities*, Washington, DC (WA), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017, p. 19-30.

2. See LARUELLE François, “What is Non-Philosophy?” in MACKAY Robin (ed.), *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, trans. Miguel Abreu, Taylor Adkins, Ray Brassier, Falmouth (UK), Urbanomic/ Sequence Press, 2012: “The impression that philosophy plays an excessive role in non-philosophy stems from the fact that the functions of the former are now clearly defined and specified”, p. 237.

3. Less sympathetically, this strategy might refer to the suspension of oneself-as-critical-reader, or the suspension of one’s own disbelief, in order to allow oneself to experience a non-standard poetics, or to see what non-philosophy *can do*.

Just as, in Laruelle, “philosophical speech [and] philosophical language has become impossible for us⁴”, so does Taylor Adkins suggest that any critico-philosophical “introduction” to non-philosophy is but “an illusion⁵”. The combination of these statements can help us to produce a working model for observing the non-philosophical paradigm: the impossibility of “introducing” the non-philosophical via an application of critico-doxastic gestures reflects the making-impossible, or the demonstration of the very impossibility, of standard philosophical practices through the operations of non-standard procedure. Laruelle gives another sense of this impossibility when he remarks in an interview given with Marjorie Gracieuse, Anthony Paul Smith, and John Mullarkey that

[t]he subject who operates and tests out non-philosophy is always engaged as an object which is treated by non-philosophy itself. He is himself a transformed subject, but here the performance does not return to a singular act. He is subjective but only subjective-in-the-last-instance: a generic subjectivity⁶.

Here, the non-standard operator can be seen to recall the technical object that, measuring or recording the behaviours of a quantum system, comes to partake in and describe a further object of that system as a necessary condition of its observations. The non-philosophical subject is a real transcendental instrument for the mediation, and as lived receptacle, of the Real. At the levels of analysis and experimentation the subject does not engage *with* a non-philosophical apparatus but is rather treated *by* that apparatus in an act of transformation. By extension, the passivity of the generic subject articulates a passivity-in-the-last-instance insofar as she is an object transformed out of, and according to, the non-standard materials she observes. In order for one to “test out” non-philosophy, then, requires the application of a certain non-analytic attitude or spirit that respects the determination- and conditioning-in-the-last-instance of oneself-as-subject.

Such notions of “passivity” and “fidelity” should not be confused with absolute limitations or adherences with regards the execution of a practice or experimentation *with* non-philosophy. Counter- or non-intuitively, they instead describe the permission of an infinite expansion of non-philosophical modes or “styles⁷”, so

4. LARUELLE François, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, trans. Nicola Rubczak, Anthony Paul Smith, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 216 (modified).

5. ADKINS Taylor, “The Translator’s Scylla and Charbdis. An Odyssey of the Non-”, in LARUELLE François, *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy*, trans. Taylor Adkins, Minneapolis (MN), Univocal, 2012. ii.

6. LARUELLE François, GRACIEUSE Marjorie, SMITH Anthony Paul, MULLARKEY John, “Non-Philosophy, Weapon of Last Defence. An Interview with François Laruelle”, in MULLARKEY John, SMITH Anthony Paul (eds.), *Laruelle and Non-Philosophy*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012, p. 244-245.

7. Ibid: “Non-philosophy is not what I’ve written even though that is a style.”

long as an indifference to the “nature” of the Real is ensured. Benjamin Norris is particularly persuasive in this respect, arguing that

[w]hen speaking of experience in Laruelle, we must always remember the fortuitous superpositioning of “experience” and “experiment” in the French *expérience*. The experience of the Real is simultaneously an experiment of the Real. Or, more precisely, it is an experiment (of), and thus according to, the Real⁸.

In this way, an experience of, and an experiment with, the Real describe the same basic generic “operation”: the non-philosophical subject experiments with the Real as a consequence of her unilateral experience of it and her being according to it in-the-last-instance. As such, in the practical sense, and indeed as pertaining to this paper, our experience of non-philosophy determines the style of our experiment. Or again: there is, as Mullarkey notes, no distinction between our theorisation of non-philosophy and the manner of our applying it⁹. Let these introductory remarks observe the following contraction: *the “illusion” and impossibility of engaging non-philosophy reflects the always-prior engagement by non-philosophy of the discussion to which engagement the discussion “accords”*.

POSITION, POSTURE, SUPERPOSITION

Before coming to conduct our own non-standard interlinguistic experiment, which is to say, our experiment *with* non-philosophy and “according to” the Real, we must first attempt to think the dissociation of the terms “posture” and “superposition” in Laruelle *and* philosophy’s “game of positions”. That this dissociation be predicated on the emphasised conjunction ‘and’ as opposed to the preposition “from” is an important matter to which we shall return shortly. For the moment, let us venture that there is no indication of philosophy’s violence more explicit than the domination it effectuates over other, perhaps all other, modes of thought. This philosophical violence should not be conflated with what we have referred to above as the potentially “infinite expansion” of non-philosophical “styles”. As Laruelle suggests in conversation with Robin Mackay,

non-philosophy is Parmenidian, it is Zen, it is Spinozist, it is Malbranchist...
non-philosophy is not a circle but a straight line which, like a tangent,

8. NORRIS Benjamin, “Experience in the (Philosophical) Abyss”, in GANGLE ROCCO, GREVE Julius (eds.), *Superpositions. Laruelle and the Humanities*, op. cit., p. 112.

9. MULLARKEY John, “1+1=1: The Non-Consistency of Non-Philosophical Practice (Photo: Quantum: Fractal)”, in MULLARKEY John, SMITH Anthony Paul (eds.), *Laruelle and Non-Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 146.

touches many philosophical circles, many philosophical systems. Maybe we can understand it in that geometrical way: given a straight line, one can touch upon a great many circles¹⁰.

The word “straight” is crucial here, so too its homonym (“strait”). For it is both the levelling or flattening of philosophy *by* the non-standard apparatus that would seek to render it as equivalent to every – or in the speculative sense, any – other kind of thought. And it is the narrowing or “degrowth” of philosophy unto its decisional and positional characteristics that would seek to generalise it, or to render as generic its structure and process. It is precisely that non-philosophy is “Parmenidian... Zen... Spinozist”, etc. that distinguishes its procedure from all philosophies that proclaim, or position, themselves as “first”, so as to “surpass” all others in their wake. Each and every philosophical system is “cast¹¹” as simple and equivalent material for prospective non-standard reworking.

Our previous insistence concerning the applicability of the indefinite article “and” as opposed to the preposition “from” returns when we inspect the relation of the non-standard paradigm to the doxastic or inveterate. Laruelle writes that

[t]he science of philosophy, its thought-in-One, a real rather than a logical operation, is the means by which thought leaves the labyrinth, which is to say the means by which it recognises that it has never entered into it¹².

Because non-philosophy as “science of philosophy” is in one part founded upon the recognition of its “never having entered into [the philosophical domain]”, there is no sense in which it would seek to depart or escape *from* that decisional structure. As “science” of that structure, it would instead diagnose it from without, or more particularly, as *prior to* its instantiation. As lived production of this diagnosis or discovery, the non-standard subject relays the antecedence of non-philosophy’s exit-without-escape. Laruelle notes that

it cannot be a question of making man “exit” from the enclosure that [philosophy and the Human Sciences] form together as a function of their very conflict. It is instead a matter of showing that he never entered into it, that this conflict is not his affair, except from the point of view of a unitary hallucination whose mechanism must be analysed; that he is determined and

10. MACKAY Robin, LARUELLE François, “Introduction. Laruelle Undivided”, in MACKAY Robin (ed.), *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, op. cit., p. 9.

11. SMITH Anthony Paul, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, Polity, 2016, p. 19.

12. LARUELLE François, “Philosophy and Non-Philosophy”, in MACKAY Robin (ed.), *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, op. cit., p. 248.

complete from the outset, and absolutely precedes the phantasms of anthropo-logical parallelism¹³.

Since he is always-already “determined[...] complete” and generically ensured *prior* to the philosophical hallucinations that would otherwise seek to determine him – as the creature that “is wise”, or that “thinks”, or that “has language”, or that “speaks”, or that “laughs”, or that “makes art”, or that “has culture”, or that “is political”, and so on – the Human, as Laruelle writes in *A Biography of Ordinary Man*: “gathers in himself the real par excellence [as] a part before the Whole, a being before Being, an event before History¹⁴”.

This generic reality of man refers both to his determination-in-the-last-instance by, or according to the Real, and also to his attitude or “posture” with regards the Real of his determination. The latter “posture” of man, then, is precisely the manifestation of his determination by the Real. This notion is compounded in Laruelle’s “The Truth According to Hermes”, wherein “[t]he secret” (or Real) as “non-positional (of) itself” goes “unreflected upon” by the “pure” Hermes-figure¹⁵. Situated in unilateral relation to “the secret” that determines him as real-in-the-last-instance, Laruelle’s Hermes would not seek, because he cannot seek, to determine that secret (or to “position” himself in relation to that secret) reciprocally. This can perhaps help us to make sense of the contraction in *Introduction aux sciences générique* that describes “posture” as “the generic *a priori* dimension of Man¹⁶”. That Man would not, according to his generic dimension, “reflect upon” the secret connects to the non-standard presentation of thought as non-representational posture of the Real¹⁷. Whilst these structurations demonstrate the negative or limitative aspect of Man – such that he is determined by that which he must himself leave undetermined¹⁸ – it is also precisely

13. LARUELLE François, “A Rigorous Science of Man”, in MACKAY Robin (ed.), *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 44-45.

14. LARUELLE François, *A Biography of Ordinary Man. On Authorities and Minorities*, trans. Jessie Hock & Alex Dubilet, Cambridge (UK), Polity, 2018, p. 45.

15. LARUELLE François, “The Truth According to Hermes. Theorems on the Secret and Communication”, trans. Alexander R. Galloway, in *Parrhesia*, vol. 9, n° 20 (2010). En ligne : http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia09/parrhesia09_laruelle.pdf.

16. LARUELLE François, *Introduction aux sciences génériques*, Paris, Petra, 2008, p. 117 (as cited and translated in Ó MAOILEARCA John, *All Thoughts are Equal. Laruelle and Non-Human Philosophy*, Minneapolis (MN), University of Minnesota Press, 2015, p. 156).

17. Ó MAOILEARCA John, *All Thoughts are Equal. Laruelle and Non-Human Philosophy*, *ibid.*, p. 27: “instead of a thought representing the Real in being cut off from it... thought... performs the Real as a postural part of it.”

18. Or, in KOLOZOVA Katerina, *Cut of the Real. Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy*, forw. François Laruelle, New York, Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 139: the stranger-subject “is always already ‘touched’ (*affecté*) by the real—or rather, in the grasp of the real—whereas the real continues to be untouched by the concerns of the Stranger and by the world.”

according to the postural dimension or orientation of Man and of thought out of which the radically experimental possibilities of non-philosophy can be performed. As Ó Maoilearca notes, “posture can be understood as the *root* of a ‘radical inversion’ of philosophy in relation to the Real...”¹⁹ In this way, by enshrining the “completeness” of Man as prior to philosophical “hallucination”, the non-philosophical subject is preserved from capture. His experiential indifference to the Real simultaneously delivers an “inversion” of philosophy’s claims to its determination²⁰, and recasts the mechanics of those claims as simple materials for possible worlds.

Here, we are reminded once more of the performativity of non-philosophy as theoretico-practical impulse that would refuse even the implied conjugation of theory and praxis, precisely given its dualistic (which is to say, decisional) rendering. It is rather that, through the invocation of items such as the Large Hadron Collider at CERN and quantum superposition, non-standard performativity demonstrates philosophy’s suspension *and* some certain style of its mutation. Laruelle might be seen to invoke an image of the Large Hadron Collider in conversation with Phillippe Petit, noting that he “[constructs] a system, but it is made up of collisions. It’s a matter of conjugating and producing some new ideas, such that they destroy some others²¹”. These “collisions”, then, as constitutive of the materiality of the non-standard system, produce the transformations of the ideas that they conjugate. These ideas are both philosophical in nature, and, as attested to in the very invocation of quantum apparatus and concept, also drawn from outside of philosophy²². The democratisation of this performative adoption is formalised in the idempotent non-philosophical expression $1 + 1 = 1$, that, as Smith notes,

[refers] to the fact that when... two waves are superposed with one another they don’t produce a synthesis but instead their individual identities remain while a new third identity is produced that nevertheless remains those two waves at the same time²³.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

20. See BADIOU Alain, WOODARD Ben, “Interview”, in BRYANT LEVI, SRNICEK Nick, HARMAN Graham (eds.), *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Melbourne, re.press, coll. “Anamnesis”, 2011, p. 20: “The strength of philosophy is its decisions in regards to the Real.”

21. PETIT Phillippe, LARUELLE François, “Laruelle: Concept-Collider” [“Je suis un collisionneur de concepts, pas un dialecticien”, in *Philosophie Magazine*, 2 Apr. 2015], trans. Timothy Lavenz, *fragilekeys*, 10 Dec. 2017: “I am a collider of concepts, not a dialectician”. En ligne : <https://fragilekeys.com/2017/12/10/laruelle-concept-collider/>.

22. Here, again, we refer to the suspension of a philosophical violence by the non-standard structure. For it is precisely this suspension that performs the exit-without-escape of the quantum, the aesthetic etc. style of thought.

23. SMITH Anthony Paul, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

The equivalence of the artefacts programmed by non-philosophy can both facilitate or permit potential modalities of expansion and articulate the (modified) quantum posture or spirit in which its superpositional procedure would perform. Rocco Gangle and Julius Greve are particularly helpful in this respect, arguing that

although the concept of superposition arises from quantum physics, the use non-standard philosophy makes of it is not restricted to rethinking the relations among mathematics, science, and philosophy. Instead, the way the mathematics of quantum theory revises traditional underpinnings of both classical physics and standard philosophy is treated by Laruelle as the basis for constructing a general model for using theoretical materials *not* in their traditional role as formal determinations of objects, but in an unusual way as catalysts for creative underdetermination or potentialization both in and across a variety of domains²⁴.

In this light, the non-summative expression $1+1=1$ can be seen to perform the collision of particles of thought for producing new superposed constructions, and to perform the superposition of science and philosophy for producing novel non-standard installations.

NON-STANDARD INTERLINGUISTICS: AN EXPERIMENT

It is clear, then, that non-standard idempotency, as concretised in the expression $1 + 1 = 1$, develops a performatory operation that opposes both the synthetic machinery of the dialectic, and philosophy's contingent assimilation of the conceptual artefacts of its choice. To return briefly to the extract from Gangle and Greve's essay above, it is important to re-emphasise that the 'underdetermination[s] or potentialization[s]' that non-philosophy effectuates are situated "both *in* and *across* a variety of domains". Whereas we might wish to connect this latter tangential movement *across* to the rendering-democratic, -generic, and -equal of all modes of "thought", that non-philosophy engages a variety of conceptual regions *from within* refers to its potential to transform and mutate the "circles" that it "touches" upon or passes through. Thus, just as in Smith's words, "[s]tandard philosophy is inserted into [the non-standard philosophical] apparatus and worked upon²⁵", so too might various other standard conceptual models be inserted in this way for the fundamen-

24. GANGLE ROCCO, GREVE JULIUS, "Introduction: Superposing Non-Standard Philosophy and Humanities Discourse", in *Superpositions. Laruelle and the Humanities*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

25. SMITH ANTHONY PAUL, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

tal destabilisation of the (sometimes clandestine) structures and procedures of their establishment. In yet another sense, the superposition of some x onto non-philosophy can facilitate the development of a new style of the latter, or better: to *force* non-philosophy into developing a new style of itself. By superposing these remarks with Laruelle's assertion that "a multiplicity of presentations of non-philosophy is possible... [which] testifies to its plasticity and its universality rather than to a formalism²⁶", we would like to produce a non-standard presentation of interlanguage, that would, if successful, force a new presentation of the non-standard apparatus facilitating our experiment.

We will recall from the abstract to this paper that the standard definition of interlanguage proposed by Crystal names the developmental zone situated between a speaker's native language and the target language that that speaker seeks to acquire. In this sense, it is possible to produce a simple grafting of this teleological arrangement onto a certain naïve "understanding" of non-philosophical vocabulary, such that a movement from a philosophical *overdetermination* of the World to a non-philosophical *underdetermination* would be emphasised. Whilst we can acknowledge from the outset the naïvete of such a presentation – we have been careful, for instance, to refer to the exit-without-escape of Man and non-philosophy from philosophy's decisional circle – there is a sense in which it can serve pragmatically as a useful reminder – particularly for those of us working in an academic humanities context invariably steeped in, and structured by, philosophical auto-positioning – to examine both the conceptual items that we inherit and their conventional applications in the name and adoption of a rigorous, perhaps "heretical", scholarly attitude. The shedding of the World-as-philosophically-saturated reminds us of the tripartite structure of the entries in the *Dictionary of Non-Philosophy* that each "[propose]... a classically general definition, a summary of the philosophical treatment of the problem, and finally the presentation of its non-philosophical interpretation²⁷". In the terms of our tentative and naïve reading, then, the tripartite structure of these entries would nominate a trajectory for acquisition upon which the speaker-subject would begin to dissociate a whole suite of technical terms from their "philosophical treatment" towards the non-philosophical interpretation and transformation of such treatment and of the terms themselves. This non-philosophical interpretation, or the "understanding" of these items according to their remodelisation by the transformative apparatus, would in turn stand as the language-material "acquired" by the speaker-subject.

26. LARUELLE François, "What is Non-Philosophy?", *op. cit.*, p. 212.

27. LARUELLE François, *Dictionary of Non-Philosophy*, trans. Taylor Adkins, Minneapolis (MN), Univocal, 2013, p. 15.

In these provisional terms, the mobilisation of a “newly-acquired” non-philosophical language is produced out of a naïve reversal of the tendency of the interlinguistic chain of command that would render workable or “occasional”²⁸ the materials of the inveterate World following from the adoption of the non-standard posture. Laruelle might be seen to express the nature of this reversed tendency in the introduction to the *Dictionary of Non-Philosophy* where he states that

[n]on-philosophy’s vocabulary is mainly that of philosophy, but each term is constantly reworked in its sense, in its figure and sometimes in its signifier. This language is taken from anywhere in the tradition – a toolbox, no doubt, but where the box itself is a tool, where every tool is inseparable from the box²⁹.

Rather than simply expressing the reversal of the interlinguistic mode of acquisition that we posited initially, however, we can notice that Laruelle’s statement effectively undermines the very terms of our preliminary undertaking. That the philosophical tradition (as toolbox) would be inseparable from the tools or concepts delivered from that box suggests both the magnitude of the non-philosophical purview, and, once more, the performational style of its transformations. In other words, it is according to the rendering-generic of the doxastic tradition *tout court* that universalises and equalises the artefacts of that tradition before the non-standard interpretative apparatus; and it is according to non-philosophy’s transformative treatment of the tools that announces the democratisation of the box. As such, we must refrain from imposing an artificial and stepwise presentation of the interlinguistic schema, and instead treat the tendencies toward acquisition and remodelisation as two dimensions of the same performative gesture. This gesture – which does not refer to the ligature³⁰ of interlinguistic tendencies, precisely because they do not exist as discrete operations – can be abbreviated in the construction: non-philosophical language “is what it does, it does what it says by saying it”³¹.

28. For a discussion of non-philosophical occasionalism, see SMITH Anthony Paul, “Thinking From the One. Science and the Ancient Philosophical Figure of the One”, in MULLARKEY John, SMITH Anthony Paul (eds.), *Laruelle and Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 28: “The Real is radically autonomous from thought, but thought, as ultimately Real in-the-last-instance, also contains a certain relative autonomy and so any particular expression of thought can be taken as simple material for an occasional theory. Occasional in this sense refers to the lack of self-sufficiency in those theories, a positive lack that protects against philosophical illusions of correlation with the Real.”

29. LARUELLE François, *Dictionary of Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

30. For a discussion concerning the formal poetics of the ligature (with a particular emphasis placed on usages of the common ampersand (&)), see my extracts from “Notes on The Symptom”, in *Datableed*, n° 6 (2016). En ligne : <https://www.datebleedzine.com/calum-hazell>.

31. LARUELLE François, *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.* p. 168.

The naïvete of our preliminary discussion of interlanguage amounts in large part to its structural alignment to its inherited form. In order to effectuate a mutation of this doxastic presentation, let us spend some time attending to the interlinguistic zone itself. That we have so far effectively bypassed this developmental zone in our regurgitations of the established definition of interlanguage might be seen to reflect the obstructive sense of its standard structural positionality. Put otherwise, as a result of the emphasis placed in Crystal's definition upon the subject's movement toward an acquisition of, and proficiency in, the target language, the interlinguistic state comes to describe so many degrees of insufficiency, haunted by the tongue not-yet-acquired³². Whilst this standard presentation no doubt provides an insightful articulation of the visceral narrowness of the co-ordinates of one's foundational comprehension of, and negotiations with, a body of language in the process of its being learnt, by refusing to condescend down to this intermediary zone, we can begin to appreciate the possibilities for the transformation of the broader teleological structure in which it is nested.

In one sense, a basic inversion of the standard interlinguistic zone can be built out of a response to the simultaneity of limitative and generative impulses in non-philosophy's transformative treatment of doxa. Laruelle gives an example of this simultaneity in his description of non-philosophy as

not an intensified reduplication of philosophy, but rather *its "simplification."* It does not represent a change in scale with respect to philosophy, as though the latter was maintained for smaller elements. *It is the "same" structure but in a more concentrated, more focused form*³³. By seeking to universalise, and render as generic the philosophical tradition, then, the non-philosophical treatment and usage of the artefacts of that tradition establishes a "concentration", or minimal condition, of philosophical artefacts and its own "simple" presentation as composed of those artefacts. It is in this way that what non-philosophy does (to philosophy) is that which it says (of philosophy) in its saying it. Whereas our discussions of the interlinguistic zone up to this point have firmly situated it between the speaker-subject's native tongue and the target language, we are less clear as to what might constitute the "betweenness" or intermediate cha-

32. Our intention is not to denigrate the sense in which – particularly in pedagogical terms – the notion of interlanguage, and the study of interlinguistic behaviours, has proven useful for developing teaching methods for facilitating a non-native speaker's comprehension of a foreign language. We are instead interested in the potential malleability of concepts extracted democratically from a variety of intellectual domains (in this case, the linguistic concept of interlanguage) in the event of their superposition with a non-standard apparatus. As we have noted, we hope that this experiment might both effectuate a conceptually generative 'mutation' of the term or idea at hand, and also force non-philosophy into a new presentation of itself.

33. LARUELLE François, ALKON Gabriel (ed.), GUNJEVIC Boris (ed.), *The Non-Philosophy Project. Essays by François Laruelle*, New York, Telos Press, 2012, p. 220, emphasis added.

racter of non-standard operations. Whilst non-philosophy's suspension and reduction of philosophical materials might be presented as a form of intervention, inter-position, or inter-ference, it would not be accurate to describe non-philosophy as situated *between* the concepts of its collisions or the philosophical and scientific materials out of whose superposition it is produced.

If it does not manifest an interlinguistic state of itself, then, we might instead venture to present non-philosophy-as-(h)interlanguage. If a "hinterland" describes the "area lying beyond what is known or visible"³⁴, the term (h)interlanguage would describe that usage produced beyond philosophical knowledge and the World that that knowledge illuminates and makes visible. This coinage would both oppose what Laruelle refers to as the "pure transcendental usage"³⁵ of non-philosophical language to philosophical narratology (in so doing, connecting the former to its postural accordance to, and axiomatic performances of, the One), and express the non-positionality out of which its superpositional operations are conducted. The term (h)interlanguage might also come to express a mutated or non-standard interlinguistic zone for the potentialisation of its established passive structuration as a radically transformative linguistic field or event³⁶. It is possible to connect this notion of (h)interlanguage to Smith's summary of non-philosophy as

[t]he act of creating fiction or "fabulating". Something is made by non-philosophy with the materials of philosophy and the world it creates. While non-philosophy also describes that world... such a description is given in order to relativize and disempower what self-presents as sufficient and absolute³⁷.

34. <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hinterland>.

35. LARUELLE François, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 216: "When it is... returned not to its cause directly, by a new metaphysics as "transcendental linguistics", but to the cause of its pure transcendental usage, language undergoes a reduction to what we... call *words-without-language* or to *symbols*, not literal, but verbal and conceptual."

36. In this sense, the parenthetical token (h) situates an expression of the superposing of interlanguage and the non-standard apparatus insofar as the parentheses instantiate both a typographic dissociation of the modified and standard terms, and a performative resistance of the former in respect to the latter. This strategy should be seen to reflect the discussion of non-standard operators in SMITH Anthony Paul, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Here, Smith notes that in Laruelle's work, we find 'certain propositions... placed in parentheses. This acts to suspend the relational aspect of the term, while also allowing for such a suspension of distance to be viewed, since this distance has an effect within the philosophy-world. Relatedly, Laruelle often uses hyphens to create a graphical expression of the undivided-in-the-last-instance character of a concept – that is, he wants to eliminate philosophical distance even at the level of the grapheme in his writing.' As a measure of convenience, this parenthetical token (h) might also announce the *heretical* performance or inversion of the interlinguistic schema. Our token (h) would that that heresy be demonstrated graphically.

37. SMITH Anthony Paul, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 119-120.

By superposing Smith's description with (h)interlanguage, it would be possible to speak of (h)interlinguistics as the practice of "fabulating" linguistic worlds via the "disempowerment" and derangement of native and foreign tongues. This (h) interlinguistic fabulation might involve the development of new strategies of colliding and superposing doxastic or discipline-specific artefacts for producing radical vocabularies adequate to the performance and verbalisation of generic Human life. It might also refer to the democratic expansion, systematic degrowth, and "symbolization" of language for the heretical equalisation of spoken, written, symbolic, animal, machinic, musical, textural, mystical, quantum, extraterrestrial (...) modes of expression and transmission. It is possible that future developments and configurations of the (h)interlinguistic concept could come to inform new techniques in experimental pedagogy, to produce radical "minoritarian" understandings of pidgin, dialect, and vernacular, and to facilitate innovative methodological and compositional practices for an array of non-standard art forms³⁸.

The mutation of the standard presentation of interlanguage can be consolidated through the rigorous inversion (as distinct from the naïve reversal articulated above) of its teleological structure of acquisition. This inversion pertains both to the movement towards what might be termed the "unlearning" of doxastic projections of knowledge, and towards the performance of a pure "non-communication" of the Real. Laruelle fleshes out this latter notion in "The Truth According to Hermes", writing that

[w]ith excess communication come opacity and inhibition, which are a perverse effect of hermetology. Rather, the task of the hermetician is to turn the communication decision, the meaning and interpretation decision, in the immediate data of the One or of the Non-interpretable, into a pre-hermetological experience that in the last instance determines communication³⁹.

Here, the "pure" or non-hermetician opposes to the communicative establishment and projection of unitary knowledge practices of speech and thought according to the One in-the-last-instance. The pure hermetician, in other words, is she who "experiences" her non- or unilateral relation to the One and speaks and thinks

38. For a discussion of non-standard art practices, see Ó MAOILEARCA John, LARUELLE François, "Artistic Experiments with Philosophy: in Conversation with John Ó Maoilearca" in Cox Christopher, JASKEY Jenny, SUHAIL Malik (eds.), *Realism Materialism Art*, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2015, p. 181: "non-philosophy is only a work of non-standard art if it openly takes for its base material an artistic activity as given and causes it to follow the constraints appropriate to that material. It is the end of aesthetic objectivity and the creation of a 'genre' that must in all rigor be called 'non-aesthetic' art—or even more strictly 'non-art'."

39. LARUELLE François, "The Truth According to Hermes", *op. cit.*, p. 22.

in fidelity to this experience⁴⁰. We are reminded at this juncture of Norris's superposing "experience" and "experiment", such that the non-communicability of the One does not indicate the One's absolute ineffability, but rather its radical indifference, and thus, its infinite tolerance to being named⁴¹. The pure hermetician experiments *with* and *from* the One by establishing a suite of non-representative, non-signifying, non-hermeneutic, and non-denotative naming-rituals, that do not "touch" or reach for the Reality of their own radically immanent inflection. By extension, this non-communicative experimentation establishes the determinate condition for a non-standard usage as such. As Laruelle notes in *Principles of Non-Philosophy*:

non-philosophical language is in fact the identity of-the-last-instance of language and speech or of any other antinomy "Language" covers. From this perspective it is thus the only intrinsically performational language, which only exists insofar as it is practiced, being already practiced when it only exists in the phenomenal state or *as it is...* and being already practiced, moreover, when it is actualized *as such* in the production of non-philosophical statements⁴².

Consequently, the non-communicative performance of a non-philosophical language-material articulates a repudiation of Heideggerian apophantics and declarative constructions insofar as such statements would affect to arrange the One's disclosure or unveiling. A non-standard language-practice, then, announces the generic subject's experimental expansions *from* the One-in-the-last-instance. The experiments of the generic subject, of the pure hermetician, from the One describes once more her fidelity to her "experience": she is non-communicative of that which does not itself speak.

The pure hermetician's performances in language are also shaped by, and thus faithful to, the One's "invisibility", as the fourth theorem of "The Truth According to Hermes" makes clear:

40. See LARUELLE François, "A Summary of Non-Philosophy", trans. Ray Brassier, in *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 290: "The One is not an object or entity 'in-itself', in opposition to a language subsisting 'in-itself', such as to compose a philosophical or dialectical pairing of opposites. Vision-in-One as matrix of thought is a 'speaking/thinking according to the One'. Nor is it a relation of synthesis between the One (i.e. the real) and language. It is a non-relation, a 'unilateral duality'."

41. See SMITH Anthony Paul, "Thinking From the One. Science and the Ancient Philosophical Figure of the One", *op. cit.*, p. 20: "The One functions as a name for what remains not unthought, but rather always insufficiently thought, what is radically immanent and foreclosed to thought, but infinitely effable."

42. LARUELLE François, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

Next to the unitary and authoritarian Hermes, there is another Hermes. He defines the essence of truth as a secret, but as a secret that in order to exist and to be made known needs none of the light of logos, none of the tricks of meaning, the strategies of interpretation, the horizons of the World, or the transcendent forms of appearance. Truth as secret exists autonomously prior to the horizontality of appearance. The secret enjoys an absolute precedence over interpretation; it is itself the Uninterpretable from which an interpretation emerges. It is the invisible that has never been visible because it is known from the outset to be invisible⁴³.

Thus, just as the experimental performances of the non-(authoritarian) Hermes respect the non-enuciation of the “secret”, so too does the secrecy of the Real refer to its non-disclosure. The One does not speak or “appear”, nor can it be forced into speech or appearance through the application of some interpretative stratagem or another. This presentation of the linguistic and the optic, such that they articulate equivalent dimensions of the One’s non-communicability, can be seen to connect to Laruelle’s concept of vision-in-Black. In the second part of the poem “Universe Black in the Human Foundations of Colour”, Laruelle writes that

Man, who carries the Universe with him, is condemned, without knowing why, to the World and to the Earth; and neither the World nor the Earth can tell him why: The Universe alone responds to him, by being black and mute⁴⁴.

The contrast here between the “light of the logos” and “the World” in the fourth theorem of “The Truth According to Hermes” and the “blackness and muteness” of “the Universe” could hardly be starker⁴⁵. Whereas philosophy and the World (as the celestial body of philosophy’s sufficient illumination) are “one and the same⁴⁶”, the black Universe – also “deaf and blind⁴⁷” – refers to the Real that “[n]o light has ever seen⁴⁸”. The generic subject, the pure hermetician – rendered in Laruelle’s

43. LARUELLE François, “The Truth According to Hermes”, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

44. LARUELLE François, “Universe Black in the Human Foundations of Colour”, trans. Miguel Abreu and Robin Mackay, *From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

45. This starkness, of course, does not imply a reversibility of light and blackness: non-philosophy is not an alternative, or just one more, philosophy. We are not faced with a choice between non-philosophy and a certain philosophical system of disclosure. There is no decision here to be made.

46. SMITH Anthony Paul, “Thinking From the One. Science and the Ancient Philosophical Figure of the One”, *op. cit.*, p. 29: “For Laruelle, the World and philosophy are one and the same; the World is the form of philosophy.”

47. LARUELLE François, “Universe Black in the Human Foundations of Colour”, *op. cit.*, p. 403: “The Universe is deaf and blind, we can do nothing other than love it and assist it.”

48. *Ibid.*, p. 404: “No light has ever seen universe black.”

poem simply as “Man” – does not “see” the Universe either, but sees rather the lightness of the World, through his vision-in-Black, for what it is: the projection of philosophy and the specific form that that projection takes. Put otherwise: vision-in-Black refers to the generic subject’s vision *from* or *according to* the blackness of the Universe⁴⁹ through which the hallucinatory nature of philosophy is known, seen, and spoken⁵⁰.

To return in conclusion to our discussion of non-standard interlanguage, then, we call speaking-in-the-last-instance that which describes performative usage in the (h)interlinguistic state. Speaking-in-the-last-instance connects to the non-standard symbols “words-without-language” and “force (of) speech” the diagnostic sense of vision-in-Black as an expression of the generic subject’s “knowledge” and “remodelling” of doxastic materials according to the One. In this sense, speaking-in-the-last-instance comes to articulate a reversal of Man’s being “spoken” and determined *by* philosophy, such that the latter’s claims to sufficiency are rather “spoken” *by* and *through* the *a priori* posture of Man⁵¹. This aspect of speaking-in-the-last-instance might be considered to develop a (h)interlinguistic dimension to the presentation in Smith wherein the “processing of philosophy through the [non-philosophical] apparatus is what allows for the identity of philosophy to emerge or be seen⁵²”, such that the subject’s regionalisation of philosophy is verbalised with recourse to the materials modified (out) of its World⁵³. Speaking-in-the-last-instance means to establish a suspension and minimisation of philosophy (as decisional arrangement of artefacts) and to perform this suspension non-communicatively from the postural non-position of the (h)interlinguistic state.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 402: “The Universe isn’t the object of thought, a greater object than the World; it is thought’s *how* or its *according to*.”

50. The connection of vision-in-Black to the performance of a knowledge-in-the-last-instance follows Galloway’s presentation in GALLOWAY Alexander R., *Laruelle. Against the Digital*, Minneapolis (MN), University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 150: “If you open your eyes partway you see white, but if you open them all the way you see black... Laruelle’s human is one who opens its eyes in the night, not to look or speculate but *to know*.”

51. In this way, Man is performatively returned (and not really returned, since a real return would suppose an exit) to that primordial structure described in “Universe Black in the Human Foundations of Colour”, *op. cit.*, p. 402: “In the beginning there is Black – man and the Universe, rather than a philosopher and the World.”

52. SMITH Anthony Paul, *Laruelle. A Stranger Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

53. See GANGLE ROCCO, “Laruelle and Ordinary Life”, in MULLARKEY John, SMITH Anthony Paul (eds.), *Laruelle and Non-Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 78: “Non-philosophy rejects not philosophy but only philosophy’s self-legitimating and hence thoroughly relative circumscriptions of its Other(s). The Stranger thus does not opt out of the real world, but instead sees that the world itself as defined *a priori* by philosophy as a form of contest and enclosure (however infinite or horizontal in principle) in fact opts out of the ordinary human real.”

Whilst on the one hand, this symbol makes explicit its determination by the Real through its usage by a generic practitioner, it does not overlook the auto-proliferation of standard linguistic processing and the World that it forges. As Laruelle writes in his essay “What is Non-Philosophy?”, “[t]he objection according to which non-philosophy overvalues philosophy or has not invented its ‘own’ language would be laughable were it not the direct expression of philosophy’s resistance”. Comparatively, the experimental vocabularies created in the (h)interlinguistic zone, and verbalised-in-the-last-instance, will therefore come to acknowledge performatively the hierarchisation of communicative nomenclature – this is German/this is French, this is formal/this is natural, this is major/this is minor, this is spoken/this is written – through the simultaneous flattening and repurposing of language as such. In this way, (h)interlanguage becomes the usage of the Stranger who estranges herself from the World as linguistically constituted on account of her discovery. And the “[d]e-capitalized words or non-conceptual symbols that [she] speaks” are a “radically subjective language... universal for all philosophies [and for all languages]⁵⁴”.

54. LARUELLE François, “Theory of the Non-Philosophical Dictionary”, in *Dictionary of Non-Philosophy*, trans. Taylor Adkins, Minneapolis (MN), Univocal, 2013, p. 33-34 (modified).

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