

Aleatory Gnosis, In(ter)vention and Quantagonism

Jeremy R. Smith and Jacob Vangeest

IN HIS RECENT TEXT, *Tétralogos : un opéra de philosophies*, François Laruelle briefly remarks on what he calls a “politics of invention”. Contrasting to Badiou’s “invented politics,” Laruelle asks:

[Should] we perhaps accentuate the formula otherwise into a “politics of invention”? Politics does not have to be invented according to given conditions. The point is to invent new conditions, which by definition limit invention¹.

This essay, composed of 4 sections, asks: what is at stake in the politics of invention? There are several issues that require an invention and intervention – what we term an in(ter)vention – within the politics of invention. These issues prevent any future mutation from taking place within the work of non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy; they block non-standard thought from taking place. This essay argues another kind of betrayal is possible: aleatory gnosis. We begin by introducing *gnosis* in contrast to *nomos* and *cosmos*. *Nomos* is introduced as the distribution of the world. In contrast to *nomos* (as this-worldly distribution), *cosmos* is read as divinely inspired distribution. From there, *gnosis* is developed as (other)-worldly weapon (against) the world. The second section expands on *gnosis* by relaying it as withdrawn (or radicalized) from *Gnosticism*. This analysis provides *gnosis* as both aleatory and indeterminable. The third section explores the possibility of a gnostic metallurgy to distill *gnosis* as weapon. It instigates this metallurgy as an in(ter)vention: an in(ter)vention (in) the world that ruptures the world. Finally, these in(ter)ventions are taken up within a quantized struggle – one which is named quantagonism (with a recognition that quantagonism is not the struggle for quantization; instead recognizing that

1. LARUELLE François, *Tétralogos. Un opéra de philosophies*, trans. Jeremy R. Smith, Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 2019, p. 54.

all struggle (is) already, a quantized struggle). It is essential to note that this work is not finished (it may never be finished). It has yet to be formalized into a properly demi-urgical standpoint.

ON NOMOS AND COSMOS

In *Nomos of the Earth*, Carl Schmitt defines the Greek term *nomos* as the cutting up of the world through the processes of appropriation, distribution, and management². For Schmitt, these are the primary processes of human history: A history which develops through different spheres of appropriation (first is the appropriation of the earth, then the sea, and finally the sky). As a new sphere is taken up, novel apparatuses and strategies must be created for appropriation to take place; the ship is necessary to conquer the water, the plane to conquer the air – both require novel strategies for efficient use.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari present an alternative notion of *nomos*. For them, the *nomos* is the “customary, unwritten law [which] is inseparable from a distribution of space, a distribution in space”³. *Nomos*, in this circumstance, is distinct from both *logos* and the *polis*. Where *logos* and *polis* are the coded, territorialized, or striated legal forms, the *nomos* is the implicit or immanent structuring that denies codification or striation. To make this distinction, they grant the example of chess and Go: “The *nomos* of Go against the State of chess, *nomos* against *polis*. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing it”⁴.

The question of whether *nomos* operates in conjunction with or contra *polis* is secondary to the role that *nomos* is granted in each conceptualization. For both, *nomos* is the operation that distributes the world. *Nomos* is the determination of borders. In both conceptualizations, this is an explicitly political force that operates upon the world as a means of distribution. For Schmitt, it is an explicitly military and codified operation, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari it is an immanent operation of the nomad – the molecular distribution which determines the molar.

Arguing against Schmitt, the theologian Jacob Taubes suggests that where *nomos* is the distribution of social order, *cosmos* is the divinely inspired distribution

2. SCHMITT Carl, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G. L. Ulmen, Candor (NY), Telos Press, 2003, p. 351.

3. DELEUZE Gilles, GUATTARI Félix, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, vol. 2, “A Thousand Plateaus” [*Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, vol. 2, “Mille plateau”], trans. B. Massumi, Minneapolis (MN), University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 312.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

of the World⁵. For Taubes, Schmitt fails to provide an adequate understanding of the *cosmographic* determination of the world. Together, *cosmos* and *nomos* provide a theo-political determination of the ontological distribution of the World⁶. The necessity of acknowledging the theological/*cosmographical* component of this distribution becomes abundantly clear when one acknowledges the work of Sylvia Wynter. In her seminal essay “1492: A New World View,” Wynter analyzes the *cosmography* of race⁷. Drawing upon Foucault’s conceptualization of ‘epistemic shifts,’ she signals 1492 as an ontological event: a shift from one episteme to another. Here, the theological grounding of representational categories is ruptured by biological and scientific rationality. Biological difference is signified by the categories of ‘us’ and ‘not us,’ presented along lines of biologically grounded White and Black (via methods such as phrenology). While theological representation remains within this bio-scientific ontology as a means for justification (i.e. God made us superior), Wynter suggests this is only secondary to a secular, biological foundation wherein ‘they’ are categorically distinct from ‘us’ (and thus used towards our political ends: i.e. slavery). Wynter argues 1492 is a politically motivated this-worldly counter-cosmos that ruptures the other-worldly cosmos of medieval-feudal Christendom⁸.

In *Black Prometheus*, Jared Hickman argues that 1492’s shift from other-worldly transcendence to this-worldly immanence is a theological (rather than biological), counter-cosmos. God is immanentized rather than killed. Through this theological move, the Man/God distinction is ruptured, allowing Man to take God’s place in the cosmological distribution. White, European Man – as Promethean – steals the cosmological *techne* of God; White Prometheus rebels against Zeus, in turn proclaiming himself Zeus. With the power of the Absolute in hand, Europe produces the cosmos of 1492: an imperialist cosmos. In the guise of freeing humanity, the white European uses this power to paradoxically enslave the Other and produce race. Hickman continues to suggest that the White Prometheus of 1492 inaugurates a racialized Gnosticism⁹.

5. TAUBES Jacob, The Gnostic Idea of Man, in *The Cambridge Review*, vol. 1, n° 2 (1955), p. 89.

6. It may be possible to place the *cosmos* and *nomos* alongside the two-headed figure of sovereignty presented by Georges Dumezil: *Nomos* as the magician-king, *cosmos* as jurist-priest (DELEUZE Gilles, GUATTARI Félix, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, vol. 2, “A Thousand Plateaus”, *op. cit.*, p. 351).

7. In this paper we largely use cosmography and cosmology interchangeably. Nevertheless, a distinction should be recognized. Cosmology is the logic of the cosmos, whereas cosmography is the mapping of that logic. Insofar as the conceptualization of the cosmos is recognized as a human capacity, this paper suggests that the logic and the mapping are collapsed in the figure who determines that logic.

8. WYNTER Sylvia, “1492: A New World View”, in HYATT Vera Lawrence & NETTLEFORD Rex (eds.), *Race, Discourse, and the Origins of the Americas. A New World View*, Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994.

9. HICKMAN Jared, *Black Prometheus. Race and Radicalism in the Age of Atlantic Slavery* (1st ed.), New York (NY), Oxford University Press, 2016: Gnosticism derives from *gnosis*, the Greek term for knowledge. Centered on a cosmic struggle between an evil Platonic Demiurge and the good Judeo-Christian Yahweh, Gnosticism presents the death of this World, in conjunction with Yahweh’s transcendence, as

We take a different position on *gnosis*: one where Gnosticism as *gnosis* is taken up in relation to *nomos* and *cosmos*. Here, *gnosis* is not determined by the historical position of the Gnostics (as it is in Hickman), but instead operates as (other)-worldly weapon that works from an aleatory position of rupture. This reading of *gnosis* is closer to that of Gilles Grelet. In his breviary on ‘non-religion’ or ‘theorism’ (the two terms are used interchangeably), Grelet introduces the notion of rigorous *gnosis* against sufficient s(p)ecularity, (a play on the principle of sufficient philosophy and speculative secularity; abbreviated to SS). To Grelet, *religio* is alienation and “worldly *gnosis* [of Gnosticism] lacks sharpness¹⁰”. Non-religion, or theorism as “the love of theory” seeks to foment a “radical struggle against an irreplaceable enemy: Necessity, and its worldly horizon of corruption and death which consists in what I call nihilism¹¹”. The *gnosis* of non-religion places itself against the Master, SS, and religiosity, seeing that “the *flesh*, prison and tomb of the body-as-it-is, is the instance of the SS which assures the triumph of egoisms and the thought of survival (i.e., truly, the survival of all thought in a worldly regime – of all thought which, autoreferential, autopositional, and autosufficient, *turns around*, instead of coming uniquely, dead ahead from the Real-One)¹²”. The Rebel, Grelet’s subject, is this gnostic figure who produces angelic TNT or “transcendence-non-thetic-(of)-itself” set to explode, destroy, and abolish the Master and SS. Doing so, the Rebel instigates a rebellion which would not be of the semblant; it does not mix itself with the bondage of religiosity with this non-thetic form of transcendence that is immanent (to) itself. This bracketing signals an irreversible, non-exchangeable, or, simply put, uni-lateral relation, in the rebellious form of *gnosis*. This bracketing,

salvation of humanity from the Demiurge. According to Hickman, Gnosticism posits a radical dualism between an evil, immanent World and a good transcendent World. In doing so, Gnosticism inaugurates a Manichean dualism between an “evil sphere of creation” and a “good sphere of salvation.” (Hickman 2016: 56). Hickman cites Augustine, a Manichean, as a key figure in the Gnostic inversion of Christianity: where the Platonic creator God becomes the savior and Man becomes the Demiurge. Hickman suggests that it is through a number of ruptures – the move from scholasticism to nominalism, followed by the rupture of 1492 – that Christianity opens to Gnosticism. The new cosmos of 1492 is the “literal emergence of a new world,” shattering the old cosmos, and providing a new, gnostic dichotomy where Euro-Christianity takes the position of the savior God who rescues the pagan from their inferior, evil gods (60). White Christianity, granted the techne of cosmos, provides salvation to this pagan in a new cosmography that racializes the Other as non-Euro, non-Christian heathen. Euro-Christianity is the becoming of the Absolute; God is immanentized into the colonial project; “Gnosticism is racialized” into the us-them, good-evil relation. (p. 61)

10. GRELET Gilles, “Un théorème rigoureusement gnostique”, in *Cahiers de la Torpille*, n° 4, “L’homme a-t-il des droits?”, Paris, Kimé, 2000, p. 116.

11. GRELET Gilles, “Un bréviaire de non-religion. Du théorisme, gnose rigoureuse comme antidote au nihilisme”, in Non-Philosophie, le Collectif, *Discipline hérétique. Esthétique, Psychanalyse, Religion*, Paris, Kimé, 1998, p. 182.

12. *Ibid.*, 188.

alone, is partially insufficient, and it requires three elements: 1) its aleatory formulation, 2) a preliminary theory of in(ter)vention, and 3) quantagonism.

THE INDETERMINATE ALEATORY OF GNOSIS

Withdrawn from Gnosticism, we demonstrate how *gnosis* (is) an indeterminable and aleatory weapon. In the work of Gilles Deleuze, the *aleatory point* serves as a point of rupture. *Difference and Repetition* introduces the concept as a transcendental operation, “always Other by nature, in which all the essences are enveloped like so many differentials of thought, and which signifies the highest power of thought only by virtue of also designating the unthinkable or the inability to think at the empirical level¹³”. Related to and explored alongside the affirmation of chance in the roll of the dice, Deleuze’s aleatory point opens to an indeterminable, unknown outside: a roll of the dice which opens the door to chance. Opening this aleatory future is only possible through affirmation: “an aleatory point is displaced through all the points on the dice, as though one time for all times¹⁴”. This particular aspect is more thoroughly explored in *The Logic of Sense*:

...the set of throws is included in the aleatory point, a unique cast which is endlessly displaced through all series, in a time greater than the maximum of continuous, thinkable time. These throws are successive in relation to one another, yet simultaneously in relation to this point which always changes the rule, or coordinates and ramifies the corresponding series as it insinuates chance over the entire length of each series¹⁵.

For Deleuze, the aleatory is not merely the affirmation of the roll of the dice, but the affirmation of the dice roll each time in a single time. This point contains all throws in its singular point. As such, it cannot be mastered, but can only affirm with each throw.

13. DELEUZE Gilles, *Difference and Repetition* [*Différence et répétition*], trans. P. Patton, New York (NY), Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 144.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

15. DELEUZE Gilles, *The Logic of Sense* [*Logique du sens*], trans. M. Lester, New York (NY), Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 59.

From this perspective, the aleatory point is an event which conditions all new possibility. It should be noted that the aleatory structure doesn't merely impact the future. Deleuze relates the aleatory to 'Aion' where "Aion is the straight line traced by the aleatory point¹⁶." In suggesting the aleatory is related to Aion, rather than Chronos, Deleuze makes the case that the aleatory works in the register of the future-past, rather than the linear development of the chronological present¹⁷. As producer of Aion, the aleatory institutes a multi-directional rupture of all points in time – not a linear break within history. Through Aion, the conditions of the aleatory extend over the entire series: the aleatory qualitatively transforms both future and past.

Historically, *gnosis* is derived from the Greek term for knowledge. The majority of Gnostic sects emerge in the early period of Christianity but are by no means reducible to Christianity¹⁸. Taubes situates *gnosis* in relation to Greek thought. For the Greeks, the *cosmos* is without outside. In contrast, gnostic thought understands that *cosmos* could be transgressed by a *pneuma* that "could in no way be reduced to a cosmic, mundane, or natural element." It follows that "The Gnostic way led beyond; *transcended* and *transgressed* the *cosmos*. Only in the Gnostic frame of reference does the idea of the beyond become meaningful¹⁹." As such, *gnosis* instigates a transcendental rupture from beyond the Worldly confines of *cosmos* and *nomos*: *gnosis* is situated as an aleatory and transcendental rupture of the World.

Within this tradition, *gnosis* spread as a spiritual and secretive knowledge. The 1966 Congress on the Origins of Gnosticism in Messina distinguishes *gnosis* and Gnosticism. Here, Gnosticism refers to the gnostic system of early Christianity, while *gnosis* functions as "knowledge of divine secrets which is reserved for an elite²⁰." Gnosticism is only a particular form of *gnosis*. Our aim, then, is not in Gnosticism as a historically situated form, but in *gnosis* as indeterminate unknown. Nevertheless, the form can reveal the aspects of the generic. Gnosticism historically functions through a Manichean dualism between the "light" (divine) and "darkness" (anti-divine). The World is enveloped in the darkness of the anti-divine. This world can only be escaped through the liberating act of the divine, who transcendently provides a mechanism for escape. This is gnostic soteriology²¹. The act of the divine

16. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

18. TAUBES Jacob, The Gnostic Idea of Man, in *The Cambridge Review*, vol. 1, n° 2 (1955), p. 90.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

20. As quoted in RUDOLPH Kurt, *Gnosis. The Nature and History of Gnosticism*, trans. R. M. Wilson, San Francisco (CA), HarperOne, 1987, p. 58.

21. RUDOLPH Kurt, *Gnosis. The Nature and History of Gnosticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

is at once a transcendental and indeterminable action. Transcendental, insofar as its origin takes place outside the World; indeterminate, insofar it cannot be known from within the World. As such, *gnosis* (is) an aleatory operation that ruptures both cosmos and nomos as they exist in the fabric of the World.

METALLURGIC IN(TER)VENTIONS

It follows that *gnosis* (is) the (other-)worldly weapon – one we pose as immanent to the World but irreducible to it. A throw of the dice will never abolish the World so long as it comes from the World. *Gnosis*, distinguished from the appearance of Gnosticism in the World (as racialized other to Cosmos), is disparate, dispersive, and diasporic; it is a secret knowledge unreflective of the World. We require means for distilling such a weapon. For this, we turn to metallurgy.

Metallurgy works towards a process of in(ter)vention. Deleuze and Guattari write metallurgy is confluent with nomads and *nomos*. Contrasting metallurgy with science – insofar as science seeks out universal and generalizable laws – they write:

... metallurgy is inseparable from several lines of variation: variation between meteorites and indigenous metals; variation between ores and proportions of metal; variation between alloys, natural and artificial; variation between the operations performed upon a metal; variation between the qualities that make a given operation possible, or that result from a given operation... All of these variables can be grouped under two overall rubrics: *singularities or spatiotemporal haecceities* of different orders, and the operations associated with them as processes of deformation or transformation; *affective qualities or traits of expression* of different levels²².

Metallurgy is a process of actualizing determination. It sets as its object a field of variation that is constantly in the process of variation. Rather than the production of general laws – in spite of the variation – the metallurgic process operates via this variation. It operates through the movement of variation, allowing that variation to determine its operations. This metallurgic operation, which is strictly

22. DELEUZE Gilles, GUATTARI Félix, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, vol. 2, “A Thousand Plateaus”, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

not a science, is situated “astride the thresholds²³.” While a science would seek out generalities in the metal in order to fashion the metal into objects, metallurgy, as operation, is co-extensive with the metal. It follows that the metallurgic operation is marked by innovation: invention following variation in the material. Here, they compare the sword and the sabre. The sabre, made of steel, is molded in a standard cast. The iron sword, on the contrary, is forged. Each develops through a different history (sabre from knife, sword from dagger) and is used differently (sabre attacks from the side, sword from the front). In each case – whether iron or steel – the metallurgic operation intervenes through the variation (*machinic phylum*): it does not impose itself on the variation (as an overdetermination). This inventive operation takes variation as integral to the process of production.

In a similar vein, Bernard Stiegler identifies invention as a type of borrowing. The production of technical expansion works by borrowing an external process and implementing it locally. A borrowed element is taken up in an interior milieu, producing innovation²⁴. As Derrida notes, inventions always presuppose illegality, breaking a law or contract that binds the inventor with the source they work upon. Taken together, there is a theme which binds the aleatory and gnosis alongside metallurgy, borrowing, theft, and invention²⁵. Yet, Stiegler asks, “What happens when there is no longer any exterior milieu as such[?]²⁶,” what happens when there is no exterior to steal or borrow from? It is at this point that metallurgy takes its position, in what we call a process of in(ter)vention.

In(ter)vention is the unification of invention and intervention. This is not merely a binding of invention and intervention. By bracketing the inter-, in(ter)vention signals a uni-lateral determination (the relation is without reciprocity). In(ter)vention does not, in this sense, invene or intervent. We may lack the ‘natural language’ to describe the function of in(ter)vention. This simultaneously requires a change of terrain, and, a transformation of the material we borrow/invent from (but without reciprocity). In this way, in(ter)vention is not *for* the World. Metallurgy is an operation that trespasses upon the *machinic phylum* of the metal. While it cuts with the grain/flow of the metal, the act of cutting is an external process that is imposed on the local milieu (it is not overdetermination, insofar as it cuts *with the grain*. Nevertheless, this process is an imposition on the sovereignty of the metal).

23. *Ibid.*, p. 410.

24. STIEGLER Bernard, *Technics and Time*, 1: “The Fault of Epimetheus”, trans. R. Beardsworth & G. Collins, Redwood City (CA), Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 63-64.

25. DERRIDA Jacques, KAMUF Peggy (ed.), ROTTENBERG Elizabeth G. (ed.), *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, vol. 1, “Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics”, Redwood City (CA), Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 1.

26. STIEGLER Bernard, *Technics and Time*, 1: “The Fault of Epimetheus”, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

Metallurgy ruptures the metal by intervening on the machinic phylum through the machinic phylum's own internal logic. The metallurgist does not intervene on the metal for the sake of the metal. Rather, the metallurgist in(ter)venes, uni-laterally (and without reciprocity) upon the metal, allowing the metal to integrate itself into the process. This in(ter)vention simultaneously ruptures the metal, transforming iron into sword and steel into sabre. As a corollary, aleatory gnosis instigates an in(ter)vention of the World with the purpose of rupturing the World. Such is its uni-lateral in(ter)vention.

The process of uni-lateral in(ter)vention takes the gnostic position (outside) the world: it cannot be known positively. Knowledge of in(ter)vention would flow from and out of the World. As such, in(ter)vention must be posited through the lens of fiction (posited without positivity). Fiction, here, should not be conflated with the literary genre: it is extra-literary, that is, outside of the literary world and its significations. In the philosophical tradition fiction has been understood as an experience within philosophy. Fiction has been presented as both (1) a provisional construct destined to be demolished in contrast to the hypothesis²⁷ and (2) as a (science-)fiction with the ambition to substitute itself for philosophy, as a recreational activity²⁸. In both instances, fiction is split between a scientific-epistemological dimension as positive falsehood and a not philosophical or "superior" substitution as speculative falsehood. In either case, it results in Lacan's formulation, "truth progresses only in a fictional structure²⁹." Fiction is understood as dominant or superior in either situation.

One must consider the opposite position. As in(ter)vention, fiction, especially in its metallurgic formulation, struggles (against) the World. Lacan's statement can be inverted in an attempt to give its full content: "fiction progresses when enrooted in struggle (against) the World." Here, 'only' is omitted because there are other avenues of fiction which no longer reduce themselves to these elements. For instance, one could very well make an anti-Badiouian claim (against) the communist hypothesis and substitute it for a communist fiction, but this amounts to a Vaihingerian inversion. Alternatively, one could assert the multiplicity of fictions for Laruelle³⁰ and

27. VAIHINGER Hans, *The Philosophy of "As If"*. *A system of the theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind*, trans. C. K. Ogden, San Diego (CA), Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1925, p. 85-90.

28. LARDREAU Guy, *Fictions philosophiques et science-fiction. Récréation philosophique*, Arles, Actes Sud, 1988, p. 13, 26.

29. LACAN Jacques, *Le Séminaire XVIII. D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant*, trans. Jeremy R. Smith, Paris, Seuil, 2007, p. 133.

30. LARUELLE François, *En tant qu'Un. La "non-philosophie" expliquée aux philosophes*, Paris, Aubier, 1991, p. 242. This effort has been egregiously misunderstood as a post-modernist practice.

Meillassoux's distinction between science fiction and extro-science fiction³¹, which amounts to a Lardreauian inversion, as well. These inversions are insufficient. The real rigor of fiction – fiction as struggling (against) the World – consists in its weakened status. Fiction is not as a substitute for philosophy; fiction trespasses the territories which see it as a threat. As metallurgic, fiction in(ter)venes upon the metallic materials which imposes the truth, its actualization as truth.

All of this leads us to the problem: how can one be a Stranger or Foreigner [*Étranger*] and do whatever they want³²? We do not have the free means to do what we want, especially when freedom is the negation of slavery, with slavery being the condition of the World. As Sylvia Wynter puts it:

[the West] would now not only come to overrepresent their conception of the human (by means of a sustained rhetorical strategy based on the topos of iconicity as the human, thereby coming to invent, label, and institutionalize the indigenous peoples of the Americas as well as the transported enslaved Black Africans as the physical referent of the projected irrational/subrational Human Other to its civic-humanist, rational self-conception. The West would therefore remain unable, from then on, to conceive of an Other to what it calls human—an Other, therefore, to its correlated postulates of power, truth, freedom³³.

In other words, there is an immanent struggle – between the racialized Stranger and the World – where the Stranger struggles to do what they want. The Stranger is not of the World. She only enters the world by trespassing on the borders of the World. Yet, on the terrain of the World, the Stranger does not have the means to trespass. On the terrain or *nomoi* of the World, the Stranger appears weaponless against the World.

31. MEILLASSOUX Quentin, *Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction*, trans. A. Edlebi, Minneapolis (MN), Univocal, 2015, p. 4-6.

32. LARUELLE François, "V'là d'la théorie! Entretien avec François Laruelle, précédé d'une note introductive par Gilles Grelet", in *Cahiers de la torpille*, n° 4, 2000, p. 114.

33. WYNTER Sylvia, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom. Towards the Human, After Man, its Overrepresentation – An Argument", in *CR, The New Centennial Review*, vol. 3, no 3 (2003), p. 281-282.

We may lack resistance to the present³⁴ but the solution is not found in the invention of philosophical concepts. Even the most novel of philosophical concepts reify the dominance of the World; a new image of thought is still an image of thought. Furthermore, on the other side, it is not an issue of inventing philosophy³⁵. Inventing philosophy is merely the reconfiguration of the past to best *adequately* describe the future. The struggle with the World requires the destruction of adequacy and fidelity (alongside sufficiency). Bracketing inter- allows intervention and invention to be unified. This is not a unification of sufficiency (the supremacy of the World over the Real), adequacy (equality between World and Real), or fidelity (resonance between World and Real). In(ter)vention allows for the Real's aleatory point – its gnosis – to be expressed and must do away with these three anti-metallurgic, Statist functions. We lack the discovery of invention to invent new inventions, to extricate from the philosophical-State apparatus inventions that cut with the grain. This requires in(ter)vention as a consistent mutation (within) – as aleatory, as gnosis – the World.

One must consider Jacques Fradin's distinction between real or radical (proletarian) science and academic (religious) science³⁶. Academic science is the disciplinarization, normalization, regimentation, and even silencing (*aca-demos*) of science by way of convention. Real or radical science, on the other hand, starts from the standpoint of the real (of) poverty³⁷ described by Fradin as outside of the eco-Nomized world that hallucinates poverty as moral value in an academic soteriology. Fradin's distinction between real and academic science is formulated as an antagonism of 'for' and 'against'. He seeks to conceive "a proletarian science against religious academic science³⁸." In(ter)vention is indifferent to this distinction, yet grounds itself by bracketing any relationship with the (eco-)Nomoi of the Earth. For and against are still relations-with. It is possible to see that radical, real, ethical science "takes up the heretical, separated position of the victim who *sees* and can only *see* the world as the Castle of Evil³⁹." The excluded position is "The Poor, the excluded victim of the world, separated from the World⁴⁰." This possibility arises from seeing this exclusion as, to use the Laruellean term, 'cloned' through real science to then be posed against academic science. In this sense, in(ter)vention's only 'for' is this expression through this cloning.

34. DELEUZE Gilles, GUATTARI Félix, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, New York (NY), Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 108.

35. LARUELLE François, *En tant qu'Un. La "non-philosophie" expliquée aux philosophes*, op. cit., p.145.

36. FRADIN Jacques, *La Science des pauvres. Traité de la richesse mortelle*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2005, p. 79-81.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 80. Translation by Jeremy R. Smith.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

40. *Ibid.*

With Fradin and Grelet, too, we see that practice as this matrix of the semblant – that Grelet inherits from Lardreau and Jambet’s hunt⁴¹ – must be substituted with that of in(ter)vention. We can make the equation *practice = abstract labour* on the condition, as we learn from Moishe Postone, that “[if] classical political economy provides the basis for a critique of society from the standpoint of ‘labor’, the critique of political economy entails a critique of that standpoint⁴².” Taking up either labour or practice’s ‘standpoint’, something apparent even in bourgeois political economists and even more traditional Marxist readings of the second thesis on Feuerbach, does not free it from oppressive (re)production. Practice and the standpoint of labour are not privileged sites of perception that can undo the fabric of Worldly oppression. In contrast, in(ter)vention is not practice because it brackets the inter-, and it is not labour because it cannot be exchanged or commodified. It is also not from a privileged perspective: the aleatory point (of) the Stranger is where she struggles through trespass, undoing any centrality through her entering which is simultaneously a rupture.

Laruelle provides a key in one of his early works, *Nietzsche contre Heidegger*. For him, there are three syntheses that make up the algorithm or the internal genetic formula of the Eternal Return of the Same and the Will to Power. Take the components *A*, or the Other [*Autre*] as Différance (both Derridean and Deleuzian) or (transcendental) Productive Force, at once Active and Affirmative; *Ae*, the Other as becoming which is specularly reflected as being-present [*étant-présent*] (as mixtures of dominant power); *E-e* as Being-without-being [*l’Être-sans-étant*], bearing in mind its equivalency to the Body-without-organs, the ontological coding of the libido; and the transversal bar or the symbol ‘/’ to represent sovereignty of one affirmation over the other (in this instance it is the Other’s sovereignty over Being-without-being) symbolizing the topological relations between terms. The first synthesis is posed as:

A/E-e (Or in its complete functioning
for the latter half: E-e/Ae)
Therefore: A/E-e/Ae

The second synthesis, including the first, is posed as:

E / (A/E-e/Ae)

41. LARDREAU GUY, JAMBET Christian, *L’Ange. Pour une cynégétique du semblant* (Ontologie de la révolution 1), Paris, Grasset, 1976.

42. POSTONE Moishe, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: a reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory*, Cambridge (UK), Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 57.

And the third, as it expresses the whole process, with S representing the libidinal sovereignty of the subject, as the determination of the last instance or authority [*instance*] against all instances or authority, is posed as:

$$S/(E/(A/E-e/Ae))^{43}$$

We take this algorithm as a guiding formalization of how in(ter)vention plays itself out distinctly from labour and practice. In(ter)vention throws once each time without itself becoming a totality yet brackets and bars any reciprocity with the terms it draws upon. The first synthesis constitutes a throw of the dice against a totality: Rebel (A) overthrows Master (E). But, in the second synthesis, the Rebel (A), re-inscribes itself in the place of Mastery (E=A). The third synthesis recognizes the eternal recurrence of these patterns (overthrow and re-inscription), instituting the necessity of a dice throw in each instance: once each time for all of time. If a throw ends up becoming a part of or fully a totality, that in turn requires another in(ter)vention to be struggled (against). It is through this notion of the last authority of the Stranger that no solution can be offered.

To give one example, the comfort of becoming-school is hardly a trespass. We are constantly falling back into the trap that is philosophy. In this regard, the becoming-school of non-philosophy is nothing new. Rather than in(ter)vening on the school, non-philosophy enters into a relation with the school: a reciprocal mixture of non-philosophy and the academy. Rather than transforming the conditions of the school from without, the practices of the school have been adopted within. One grows wary of the repetitions of philosophy in the non-philosophical: the application of non-philosophy to x, y, and z. Where the becoming-school of non-philosophy signals the mixture of non-philosophy with the World, the tactics of in(ter)vention – on the basis of *gnosis* from without – intercede on the World uni-laterally.

QUANTAGONISM

In his postscript, Deleuze writes “[t]here is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons⁴⁴.” We propose the metallurgic function of in(ter)vention as the distillation of new weapons that work – from a position of aleatory gnosis, outside and without – to rupture the fabric of the World. In Marx and Engels’ words,

43. LARUELLE François, *Nietzsche contre Heidegger. Thèses pour une politique nietzschéenne*, Paris, Aubier, 1977, p. 120-121. Translation by Jeremy R. Smith and Jacob Vangeest.

44. DELEUZE Gilles, “Postscript On the Societies of Control”, in *October*, vol. 59, p. 3-7 (1992), p. 4.

these weapons “abolish the present state of things⁴⁵.” Insofar as the World is in a perpetual state of variation, the process of in(ter)vention is necessary, once each time, in the distillation of new weapons: a new moment requires a new weapon.

Such a struggle is quantized, insofar as it is unknown. For to know the struggle would be to bring it back into the World. Thus, the struggle can only function, unilaterally, once each time. As such, the struggle is a necessary fiction.

We must distinguish between a quantized struggle and struggle quantized. Struggle quantized struggles to realize all struggle seeks to be quantized, unified, discretized. Quantization is the transition beyond the standard model. In physics, quantization is the transition from standard or classical physics to quantum mechanics. It is a model providing a framework for rupturing standard forms of thought. Quantization is, thus, a necessary struggle for thinking in a non-standard manner. Quantized struggle recognizes that all struggle seeks quantization, insofar as all struggle aims at a standard model (a model of the World). Struggle quantized fails because it is not generic enough. This does not mean that the significations of struggle resort to this unified field as insufficient. Rather, struggle and the multiplicity of its significations struggle to reach this quantized state.

What, then, is quantized struggle? For lack of better formulation, quantized struggle is the already-superposed formulation of all struggles, but not its verification. In other words, quantized struggle (is) already present as a generic condition of struggle. Struggle is not molded by quantization but (is) always already (tautologically) quantized insofar as it is struggle. It may be useful to name quantized struggle as *quantagonism*, a portmanteau between quantum and *agon* (though it is indeterminate whether there is antagonism present). Quantagonism is not the struggle *for* indeterminacy (to seek out indeterminacy as an object would be struggle quantized). Rather, quantagonism (is) struggle already indeterminate. Struggle, as struggle, (is) always already indeterminate insofar as it struggles against the determinate (itself always already overdetermined).

Why struggle when already (being) indeterminate? Does (being) indeterminate not imply freedom? As Bataille suggests, “Liberty implies it is impossible to fix anything⁴⁶.” Superposition is not the rejoinder to a whole or a reunion of broken things. Quantagonism’s superposition, aligned with the aleatory, aligned with gnosis, is not

45. MARX Karl, ENGELS Friedrich, *The German Ideology*, Buffalo (NY), Prometheus Books, 1998, p. 57.

46. BATAILLE Georges, *The Absence of Myth. Writings on Surrealism*, trans. M. Richardson, London, Verso Books, 1994, p. 64.

an idempotent constant. As in(ter)vention, quantagonism does not *manipulate* from the World into idempotence for the World, but rather transgresses, trespassing the multiple Nomoi of the World, (under)mining them.

CONCLUSION

Together, the three elements – aleatory, in(ter)vention, quantagonism – provide *gnosis* with the necessary components for a struggle (against) the World. This struggle is neither in nor of the World, but (is) both (in) and (of) the World as fictional rupture. Here, gnosis can only (be) fictional. When gnosis is factual it ceases to (be) gnosis, placing itself in the World as solution. Gnostic fictions (are), thus, always on the horizon, but never arriving. This soteriology is, then, one that is never finished, but must always continue: once each time and for all of time.

In this essay, we have sought out new weapons through the standpoint (of) aleatory gnosis, indeterminant and transcendental, and the method of in(ter)vention, a means of extricating material to fashion for defense against the oppressive forces of the World and bracketing its relation with it (inter-). We have also conceived of quantagonism as quantized struggle that (is) indeterminate. Being a preliminary investigation into a new vocabulary or, rather, mutation within non-philosophy and non-standard thought, all the while remaining metallurgic and not at all demiurgic (that is to come), we invite the usage of these tools insofar as they do not at all maintain a reciprocal relation, an inter-, with what it draws from.

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