

The Tolerance Principle: What is Tolerance? A New Idea

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How Do We Treat Tolerance? Problems of Method

Tolerance has a bad reputation: it is a notion with blurred outlines, with poorly determined ethical and political stakes that are often synonymous with indecision and sometimes cowardice; it is a notion that belongs to “spineless” liberalism and skepticism. It practically passes for a pious wish and theoretically for a concept without consistency. If they are not Anglo-Saxons, philosophers rarely touch on tolerance so much that it seems to belong to the media-friendly discourses of “good will.” There must be conditions of practical and conceptual existence that it may have never had.

Nevertheless, some conditions begin to at least appear politically and are now given: the emergence of “humanitarian” practices, the Idea of an internal order of law, a wide-ranging set of “politics” on the margin of states and natures and “piloted” by international organisms, all of this can make it hope for an acceptable future and perhaps make a necessary elaboration for it. By contrast, on the theoretical plane, the reunion of the conditions that render this concept plausible and utilizable remains, conditions that make it precisely a concept rather than the slogan of powerlessness. How do we pass from that which, in the international political and ethical horizon, presents itself like a blurred “morphology” towards a determined and operative concept?

One bad solution, one that is obvious but destined to fail, would be the following: taking the opposite course of this indetermination, forcing this “vague” phenomenology by introducing it against its will in such and such philosophical system destined to determine it, once more making a philosophical ethics or politics concerning it, posing it, for example, as a simple regulatory idea or as the principle of a politics of consensus; either as the “duty” and categorical imperative of an international humanity; or as the neighboring principle of “pity” and grounded on the original political community of all men; or again as a means of ameliorating, completing, or correcting an ethical and political abstraction and dogmatism, rendering them “human,” etc. The great ethical (the “man” of dogmatic or critical humanism, the “individual,” or the “subject”) or political (the “citizen,” the “sovereign,” the “nation,” etc.) categories could not have rendered possible its theoretical birth. We do not see why they would do so now except by cobbling with an ad hoc concept.

Realistically, this type of solution returns in not taking seriously and positively its “vague” character and “blurred outlines,” coming back to want to philosophically “force” it, capture it to the benefit of such or such “position” that, in itself, is in no way tolerant, not recognizing its pertinence and uses it for its benefit like a supplementary political weapon. Let us sum up this refusal: tolerance not only can and must – even by virtue of that which it is – not enter into an already known particular philosophical system or one even to come, but can and must be positively determined in its indetermination even outside of any “regional” practice; it must neither be a political position, nor an ethical principle, nor a humanitarian and psychological

¹ Any and all errors are translator’s own. – Trans.

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corrective, nor even a rule of social life in the community or emerging from sociology and economy.

By refusing tolerance any inscription in a region of the World and Society, have we then made it definitively abstract and functionless, or do we have the means, other means than traditional philosophical procedures and categories, to consider its “blurred” character and give it a positive content on the margin of political and ethical philosophy?

The indetermination of tolerance is not a deficiency but the invitation to think otherwise than according to determination and positivity that philosophical systems require as a matter of custom. There is within tolerance a “vague intention” [*intention vague*] no doubt, but perhaps above all a wave intent [*intention de vague*] and a care of indetermination that is not an insufficiency or a negative trait to philosophically “sublate,” but to conserve through its conceptualization.

In its stead, we must abandon the traditional theoretical strategy and finally take seriously its very particular “phenomenology.” How do we carry this out?

There are two uses that are possible for a vague notion that is undetermined and whose indetermination must be the meaning rather than a non-meaning to suppress. One is apparently the philosophical type but does not really respond to the conditions of philosophy, and the other is apparently the scientific type but does not either exactly respond to the conditions of science. Our whole project is to conjugate and even identify these procedures and treat tolerance on a mode that must be characterized – we will see how, under what theoretical, philosophical and scientific conditions and therefore neither precisely and exclusively “philosophical” nor precisely and exclusively “scientific.”

1) The first use of tolerance as such consists in treating it not as a regional concept (intra-political, intra-ethical) or even ontological or fundamental (the foundation of a politics or an ethics) but as transcendental in the radical sense where the transcendental would exceed the very foundation and Being. As this is the positive meaning of its indetermination, tolerance is susceptible to a universality superior to the universality of a region and superior still to the universality of an ontological foundation. Therefore, like a philosophy or a philosophical principle, it does not relate itself to the objects of a political or ethical experience nor does it constitute this experience or foundation, but rather relates itself to these metaphysical fundamental and regional (and empirical) knowledges even beyond or beside them. Neither a concept nor an Idea – its theoretical functions are always taken within the empirical/metaphysical or regional/fundamental couples – tolerance can be treated as a function that relates itself to concepts and the Ideas themselves of varying ethics and politics, *that is to philosophies themselves* insofar as they always begin with posing the circle of the regional and the fundamental as essential and moves within it. Therefore, tolerance is not a supplementary ethical or political principle: its force is to be able to relate itself globally to ethical and political philosophies (and their “restrained” concept of tolerance). Neither the Law, nor the Social Norm, nor the Ideal of Reason, tolerance is realistically and ultimately required by itself and it alone: it is the spring of our “para-philosophical” approach, commanded by the identity as such of tolerance that cannot be put to the service of particular “positions.”

On the basis of this recognition of its identity, tolerance can aim for the philosophies or ideologies of all sorts and assure that their “regulation” serves in some way as a “norm” or “principle” – but in what new sense provided this universality – for the norms and principles themselves such that they are traditionally recognized and received within thought. For example, it is not a directly anti-xenophobic principle under this form, as there is a lot of xenophobia that is simply repressed or negated within the philosophical concepts of tolerance, but a principle that represents the real critique of racist ideologies and, beyond them, philosophies insofar as they always convey a certain refusal of the Stranger.

2) The other procedure, which is a scientific type or originally scientific, consists in treating tolerance and other notions that will help in formulating and describing it as philosophically undefinable and indemonstrable terms even though they are taken from philosophy; and, therefore, in radicalizing, on a now axiomatic mode, the indetermination of such notions. In effect treated as genuine “first terms,” they contribute in forming the axioms of a hypothesis. The set of the two procedures turns towards making tolerance and adjacent terms the object of an axiomatic, one that is no logico-formal and simply deductive, but rather a real or transcendental axiomatic, as it is inevitable, with originally philosophical objects or extracted from philosophy, and not a mathematical axiomatics. Therefore, it is quite possible to make tolerance the object of an if not exact, at least rigorous discipline; a discipline that is if not deductive, at least capable of inference from a hypothesis. The full use of blurred phenomenology that appears to encumber any use of tolerance should finally lead to the formulation of a genuine *transcendental theorem* that states its existence and function in relation to experience such that we conceive it henceforth as constituted no longer by objects and the primary goals of politics, ethics, ideologies, and philosophies, but of all these as such.

In this way, tolerance and the other notions that accompany it, even though they are drawn from “naïve” and “intuitive” ethics and politics, will be ethically and politically undefinable, but definably by the very system of their axioms. Hence, the formulation of a theorem of tolerance, a non-political theorem but *for* politics, a non-ethical theorem *for* ethics, etc.

Differently from Kant who seeks a formula for existing morals, a quasi-algorithm destined to assure the *recognition* of Duty, even though he does not get out of the traditional mathematico-philosophical mixture, we seek a *purely transcendental theorem*: neither regionally mathematical nor fundamentally philosophical, nor the blend or the rationalist circle of these two things; but the identity without synthesis of these two determinations in a rigorously and solely transcendental thought that programs its “application” to ethico-political experience itself.

If Duty in the Kantian sense belongs to moral judgment and opens the possibility of an ethics, tolerance will belong not to a supra- or meta-moral judgment, but a *non-moral* or a *non-ethical* theorem in the sense that, related to tolerance, ethics and politics themselves are generalized or universalized in some sort by a principle outside of themselves, in accordance with tolerance which, far from being then a simple corrective or a softening of universal violence or a negation of ethics, formulates and prescribes both the good use of ethics and politics – but a use that must be henceforth called “non-ethical,” etc.

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The guiding problem of the 18th Century – What is Enlightenment? What is the majority of Reason and how do we get out of its minority? – finds its current equivalent in the situation that motivates tolerance. The point is to discover or invent – perhaps both – a “regulative principle” for ideologies and politics. Nothing is urgent *ex nihilo*: urgency is identical to that which makes up a symptom or conjuncture, and *our* conjuncture is within the motley of values and the hybridization of ideals, but also the scaling of wars and nationalism that come to support these ideologies, carried out in their name and *also* give rise to a hybridization, a hybridization of wars and nationalism. Therefore, now that the orb appears – whether an illusion of values appears or not, whether or not an illusion – having been scoured through, now that the World gives the impression of a great complicity [*connivence*] without principle because it is the complicity of principles themselves, now that everything and the contrary of everything, that is, nothing, is given as much as imposed to us, we must rightly no longer ask ourselves what is still to be done with politics in the singular, morals in the singular [*de politique, de moral*], etc., but henceforth, what is to be done with politics in the plural, ethics in the plural [*des politiques, des éthiques*], and ideologies? “How do we orientate ourselves within thought” could now mean – as in the 18th Century but even more crucially – how do we orientate ourselves in opinions, ideologies, politics, and ethics such that they exist in the multiple state?

It is here that tolerance is required and can, on this ruined multiplicity of opinions, finally find a practical and theoretical function that it never had. Tolerance could pass for a politico-ethical ideal of one society that feels rising within and not only outside of it the barbarism of unbound opinions and the inevitable solution to universal complicity. Yet, however, how does one break the equation tolerance = complicity and retrieve a correct “principle of action” that belongs to a rigorous thought? The residual barbarisms of history encumber the horizon and seem to “prevent” any action. The reign is the reign of the Principle of Sufficient Doxa where we will not have any trouble making, in their turn, the philosophies themselves enter into it, the philosophies that, *de facto*, are conducted like “superior” opinions. In this situation, tolerance is a withdrawal position, a position of failure, a position of marginality, even a position of “pacifism” without grandeur if, taking the problems too empirically and considering the values one by one, we are not sure that everything has been summed, traversed, and encircled.

Then, we also reduce it to being nothing but a value entering into this undefined circle. By contrast, *the affect* of this unlimited circle of values, the a priori affect truly speaking that our conjuncture is woven from, and the one that signifies that this circle is “finite,” that it is given like an identity can be, is that which imposes tolerance as a principle to exit outside of this situation and requires that it be given an originary and positive value.

Perhaps it is no longer a matter of a problem of orientation, management, or an economy of values as was the case of the problem of Reason in the 18th Century whose destination was determined in terms of this still entirely empirical first appearance of the circle of values where it was reduced to enter itself.

Now that this circle is well complete, now that it is at least received and lived like a sort of specific identity, tolerance can only exceed it and require itself, in its own autonomy in relation to the circle, another “foundation,” another reality than the reality of the circle where the Reason of the Enlightenment still had its seat.

In effect, there are precise conditions of existence for the emergence of tolerance if we must recognize it in its identity and as an autonomous force capable of acting “on” ethics and

politics in the plural. What we have called the affect of the identity of the circle of values must be better analyzed. Spontaneously, the plural ethics, the plural politics, and the ideologies of any kind claim to be absolutely valid, that is, determinant of the very *reality* of man – they are implicitly or virtually philosophies. This is why they carry out an endless war even if it means admitting a certain historico-cultural “relativism” without consequence because it continues to make a system with the ontological claim of values to finally belong to *the real itself* and not only to historical effectivity. It is because this given circle, not only as complete but as finite in its identity, means that the values form a distinct sphere of the real itself and that, if there is “possible tolerance,” it will relate itself to this circle without belonging to it, without itself being a value, an ideology, a philosophy. This is to pass from historico-cultural relativism, a concept that is void without efficacy that only appeals to a “weak” tolerance, to the *relative autonomy* of values, an autonomy that records the specific reality of their “order,” but one that remains relative this time to the authority [*instance*] of the real. The values are undoubtedly relative to one another, but we will no longer make this reciprocal relativity the very essence of the real, for everything together is still even more relative to this authority which is not and never has been – excepting nihilism and barbarism – a value and which has never entered the circle of opinions.

There is no complicity to expect from the real: by contrast, perhaps we can infer one from the necessity of a tolerance of a new type with regard to this Great Doxa. In effect, let us suppose that, contrarily to the deepest idealist thesis of *any* philosophy and the one that dooms it to nihilism and internecine war, the real, that which can and must be called thus, would be absolutely not determinable by thought and even less determinable by opinions and ideologies, that it would not be confounded with the history and the culture of peoples, and that finally this old amphibology would be dissolved: thus, we regard to this authority, all ideologies would be indifferent and therefore equivalent. On this real basis and *within* this indifference that prohibits any war, something like a tolerance could be enrooted. Tolerance would not be the very indifference of the real, but, in some sort, the manner – its organon, if you will. Tolerance is necessarily frozen by indifference, but it is not reduced to the gloomy powerlessness of indifference. A new economy of indifference and interest that is made within it. This is very contrary to the minds of realists, the authoritarians and formalists who can only scorn it: without claiming to suppress this hatred, it is perhaps possible to strip it of its “weak” political and ethical aspect and sufficiently give it with force to defeat philosophical dogmatisms and ideological sufficiencies without war.

This position of the problem implies that the reign of ideologies, that their domination and claim to define the real would be disarmed. Therefore, it cannot be a matter of a rational auto-limitation of doxic violence: it is not the work of Reason as a *principle* of auto-limitation, it is rather an absolutely heteronomous limitation precisely because it emerges from the immanence of the “real” – it will be necessary to say which one. It is a limitation that is not empirico-metaphysical, but transcendental, and we will define tolerance as a transcendental posture or force, on the one hand in that which it is a property of the real alone without nevertheless constituting or determining it in turn, and, on the other hand, in that which it relates itself to the sphere of ideological effectivity. Said otherwise, tolerance in its full and radical meaning prohibits us from believing that our opinions bear on the real or are valid theses on the in-itself of things (not only for the real, but politics, ethics, culture, etc.). Consequently, they stop being dogmatic and skeptical, violent and nihilist at once if there is an “in-itself” of ethics and

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politics in the plural. This is not what they postulate. It is tolerance as the transcendental organon by which the authority of the real can act upon them. Such that we define it, tolerance is therefore not a noumenal “in-itself” and a principle of rational auto-limitation, as would be the case in Kantian idealism. Tolerance is a transcendental “in-itself,” if we may say, and therefore, even more ultimately, real, rather than logico-rational.

Thus conceived and tried, tolerance is no longer bound to the market of ethics in the plural and the maelstrom of ideologies. We must absolutely distinguish tolerance and management, tolerance and decision, and conceive it as a force of transformation of ethics and politics in the plural? But in what sense?

It is not their effective transformation or transformation “in-themselves” as if tolerance was a force of intervention. Precisely, tolerance does not inter-vene within ideologies at risk of becoming a principle of the economy and management, a new ideology and technology or the ethical force of the moderation of chauvinisms and nationalisms. However, because it does not intervene *within* them does not mean that it is incapable of action, but that its action is immanent or constitutes an autonomous order of reality and existence that uses their contributions: bearing on the limits, the field, and mode of thought of ideologies, rather than directly and concurrently on their objects. Tolerance does not legislate on the objects of politics or ethics, but upon them both as thought and as action, and upon the sufficiency that animates them and places them in reciprocal combat.

We will attempt to elaborate some of these points more precisely.

How Does Tolerance Act Upon the Conjunction?

Tolerance requires and defines its own sphere of action, one that is not imposed upon it from the outside. It cannot be “ethics” or “politics,” the practices and the objects are not assumed to exist within one region, the region itself as an abstract eidetic horizon, but precisely identical, as identical to these objects. It contains nothing of this duality that philosophy separates and synthesizes: object/horizon, form/ground, regional/fundamental, theory/practice, etc. However, it contains, each time, the identity of objects and their regional horizon, practices and their knowledges, regional and fundamental, etc. Tolerance begins with the refusal to choose and decide, whereas philosophy begins with the supposition of the thing in-itself or entities in-themselves that it then reunites. Tolerance, for example, affects the relations as such between ideologies rather than one of them assumed isolated by philosophy without being able to otherwise say and in an adverse way that it is never so: we do not make a hypothesis of this type, the hypothesis of philosophy is an illusion that it needs to function.

How do we explain this subversion of philosophical antinomies?

Tolerance is not an intervention into situations that are assumed to exist as “real” and identifiable “in-themselves” or in transcendence, that is, independently of any relation of dependency to the real itself. This deep and generalized anti-atomism is addressed to the metaphysical Robinsonades. It is extended to the “elements,” the “parts,” and obviously to their correlate “in-itself” the “sets,” the “wholes,” society, the State, etc., as it is extended to the search for responsibilities as ethical causes. Tolerance is that which modifies not “the things themselves” – refusing any metaphysical hypothesis on the essence of things and is only occupied with phenomena – but, rather, that which is modifiable, these things insofar as they enter into a

relationship with the real. The real is precisely the very phenomenon of identity and is not content with existing within the bad chaos of blends, so that this relation receives the mark of the real, that is, a transcendental identity that is accessible to one possible thought. Generally, tolerance suspends the auto-position (within being) and auto-legitimation (within thought) of representations and – it's the same thing – accesses their identity, a transcendental property that therefore affects the relations, *our relations* of the real to the things rather than to so-called things themselves. Thus, it is useless and theoretically disastrous to determine in exteriority that which must be tolerance in accordance with events and behaviors such that we experience them primarily and illusorily from their existence “in itself.” One such tolerance, in turn, would inevitably return to war, that is, to the lack of identity, to the repression of identity.

Nevertheless, tolerance must rather have a grip [*prise*] “on” or “within” conflicts even if this grip is not a management or a superior domination but participates from an ungrasping [*déprise*]. Precisely, its efficacy entirely resides within the modification described from our relation – from the relation of the real that we are, we, men – to things and consequently – this is the maxim that tolerance imposes upon us – in this refusal to treat things as separated and synthesizable realities, as conflicts to resolve. Tolerance does not resolve conflicts; it does not manage them nor “economize” them. Tolerance constitutes an order of a new reality where they enter under the form of the identity of each of their terms, of each of their relations and each of their sides of the varying types of cleaving that they constitute. This maxim does not define an idealist posture that would end by supposing that conflicts do not exist or have no reality. One such posture would once more be a metaphysical idealism or skepticism. Tolerance solely affirms that the reality of conflicts and the reality of war rests within a universal transcendental illusion: and if something is not illusory, it is rather the transcendental illusion that claims to access the real by means of being [*l'Étant*] or Being [*l'Être*] and one that, in this way, instantiates conflict everywhere.

Therefore, tolerance is not related to conflicts insofar as they are spontaneously given during this illusion and with it. This relation would be unintelligible. Rather, it is the transcendental force that transforms them into the universal a priori of experience and that, by this very fact, assigns them an identity that suppresses them as conflicts. Tolerance is neither in retreat from conflicts, an indefinite expectation, or a halting of war, delaying war; nor grasped in their substance and sometimes constrained to a super-activism and sometimes to a passivity – it does not enter into conflicts with conflicts – but suspends their native element, the auto-position and their claim to be originally “from” the real.

The new experience of tolerance obliges us to introduce a non-Kantian distinction between the force as force-in-conflict, as a positive or negative magnitude or reality, which is by essence bi-lateral and of a physico-mathematical origin, and the suspension-force, the unilateral force that is by nature solely transcendence and therefore has conflict-force as its object. Kant's famous “real opposition” and its becoming-dialectical in Hegel, for whom the real itself is conflictual, have no pertinence to define tolerance that requires a transcendental concept, neither empirical, nor real consequently, but furthermore not made from their philosophical blend or the interiorization of the empirical within the real. Tolerance must be “saved” by the real of man if it wants to save the phenomenon of war and consequently install peace. Tolerance is a transcendental force that is exercised against war under all its forms without, however,

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waging “war against war.” Finally, tearing peace from pacifism and war from war, tolerance is *par excellence* a force of peace.

Under this form, which is not a simple metaphor, tolerance is the concept adequate to our conjuncture: without forcing peace itself, subject to surreptitiously re-introducing war into the practice of peace, tolerance makes peace that which forces war.

An A Priori-of-War

Among all *antinomies*, the antinomy of *fatal war* (war-against-war) and pacifism is imposed by its nature as a rational antinomy through its urgency and its permanent resurgence once the *great geo-political equilibria* are destroyed. This politico-philosophical antinomy that entertains the narrowest relations with the old humanism is the transcendental horizon within which the practices of humanitarian intervention are still thought – and probably thought poorly – as if the “humanitarian” did not yet have the thought, the right, and the ethics that it would be worthy of. *There are* humanitarian practices. The problem is no longer to condemn them or justify them in terms of this antinomy that is otherwise very broad and very vague for them, to subsume them under this rational horizon that is perhaps inadequate to them. Rather, the problem is to treat them as data or as a material for the most immediately human and most adequate “principle” of tolerance – human, rather than humanist. The philosophical type of solution to the antinomy assumes that war (against war) and peace make the object of a synthesis under a form that revives and displaces war as the means of peace and peace as armed peace, so that the superior conflict of war and peace is not resolved but intensified. Tolerance, rather, is a force that is globally opposed to this superior conflict without making itself a partisan for war or peace, for this (armed) war or that (armed) peace, refusing to intervene in this conflict. Tolerance is neither the passivity of pacifism and wait-and-see [*attentisme*] nor war or the armed opposition to war. Tolerance is the genuine “third” path, the other path which is not a synthesis because it is related in general to the conflict itself, rather than to the terms of the conflict as all political or philosophical type of solutions do.

Thus, tolerance is adequate to the conjuncture which sees a universal type of conflict magnified: one of the terms of the conflict is itself war. Our conjuncture is not in particular the conjuncture of wars in effect. Our conjuncture is the conjuncture of this superior war that form the multiple wars and interventions in these wars. The necessity of tolerance appears as such, without being limited to this emergence, with the end (real or apparent, no matter, it is a symptomatic question or a conjunctural question) of a massive antagonism of the kind of “class struggle” or “cold war” that leaves place for the manifestation of a *de jure* multiplicity of conflicts inserted in a new form or a universal horizon that can equally take the form of a war-against-war or non-intervention. This remark is important, for tolerance makes sense, as we have said, when the conflict as such arrives in manifestation and is given as the universal horizon for the consciousness of men in the way of an *a priori* by the necessity of which they are forced to pass through to actually access the moving reality of their era.

From this point of view, a distinction must be made between two principles of solution: the differend and tolerance. The differend is the post-modern solution to the multiplicity of conflicts when this multiplicity is not yet grasped as a genuine *a priori* of the conjuncture, so that the differend is both the taken and taking part for conflicts and sinks into universal complicity,

no doubt with some reticence. Tolerance is not more post-modern than modern. It is a posture *for* conjunctures, a posture that is characterized through its intrinsic identity (this is not the differend's case) or its performativity, that is, its actuality.

Tolerance is related to *the identity* of the conflict as conflict, as well as the infinitely open multiplicity of conflicts, a multiplicity that nothing will limit from within, no litigation-form or differend-form. Differently from humanist protestations, tolerance is not accommodated by the fatality of conflict but – this is entirely different – the a priori universality of their multiplicity. By contrast, contrarily to any philosophy and in particular to the modern ideology of resolution by communication and the post-modern ideology of the differend, tolerance poses an absolute limitation to the claim of the validity of conflicts in which it refuses them to determine the real or the human essence of man. It distinguishes between the fatality and universality of war, renouncing war-against-war (a redoubled war, an auto-polemology) and therefore renouncing the type of peace that enters into this war. Fatality signifies the fascinated fear and impossibility of acting and ends in violence.

However, the correlate or object of tolerance is the widest war – including this violence – the war between ideals and values, not between individuals, but between already universal spheres. Not the war “that comes” but the war that is always currently exercised within the depths of the social and political body and the depths of the body of humanity but whose manifestation alone has been hidden by the bad faith, the good conscious, or wild expectations. Said otherwise, the correlate or object of tolerance is a genuine universal and necessary *a priori-of-war*. Not only *is there* war, but tolerance postulates that *there is* “the” war, and that the recognition of its universal identity is the first step, perhaps a paradoxical step for our very limited consciousnesses, of its *real* limitation and its *real* transformation.

The Refusal of Meta-Ethical Hypotheses and The Meaning of Radical Evil

In the same way that “metaphysics,” in philosophy, is not only Platonism as the *passage* from the sensible to the intelligible or as transcendence, but it can be broadened or radicalized to any superseding that has the form of auto-position and doublet, the self-surveilling of transcendence, likewise ethics is not the simple superseding of mores and actions susceptible to bring morality into play. Ethics is a doublet, in this sense, that carries on morality or prolongs it by seeking out “behind” it or its horizon the subject or the principle of mores, indeed, the simple formula of moral judgment assumed to be “common.” To give its full existence to tolerance itself, we must also deploy the concept of a broadened philosophical ethics that resides in *Ethico-Moral Difference* as the general element of imputation and fault.

Ethics is a hinter-morality, nothing more.

Perhaps, in opposition to this “difference,” we then know better the way in which we comprehend the internal identity and simplicity of tolerance: in accordance with its identity or its immanent exercise alone, tolerance “as it is,” the “tolerated” which is nothing but “tolerating,” without another finality, property, or attribute, exterior function or transcendent principle; therefore, in its performativity alone.

Tolerance defines a *positive posture of use* of phenomena from the “ideological” sphere in the broadest sense of this word. It is a posture that we will call phenomenizing. Tolerance has the generosity not of phenomenology but the immanent phenomena itself, that is, the real.

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It also consists in being given the ethical and political things without making a hypothesis of the metaphysical type concerning that which they are “really” or their “in-itself.” Fully deployed in its phenomenal reality, ceasing from being a psychologico-ethical attitude, tolerance is indeed the refusal to take a certain type of dogmatic position concerning “responsibilities.” The search for responsibilities in the sense of empirical causes is one thing; the search for responsibility and the first cause of an ethical type, the famous “imputation” of fault, always testifies to *ressentiment*. Because tolerance prohibits one from forging such hypotheses, seeking to define the ethical essence or the ethical in-itself of an act, it is the limitation of ethics insofar as ethics always lives off of accusation.

Imputation and accusation are to ethics what the search for the in-itself or the essence of phenomena is to philosophy in general. If ethics is both the taking and taken part of conflicts that it claims to rule and only elsewhere and otherwise revives, the function of tolerance is to define a non-ethical use of ethics, a non-phenomenological use of war, etc. Differently from the Kantian moral judgment that says only what is good is good will and which, nevertheless, already renounces empirically identifying duty and responsibilities, tolerance even renounces the judgment, the search for the moral subject or the “intention,” the subject of fault or the rational subject of Duty. Tolerance alone thus radically understood, that is, in its phenomenal reality deprived of any rational hinter-world, can deliver the morality of hinter-worlds that secrete *ressentiment* and in particular this hinter-world that ethics and politics are when they claim to pose and legitimate themselves on the philosophical and traditional mode of auto-position. Tolerance brings about the affect of the limitation of philosophies and ideologies, a limitation that is no longer empirical but “transcendental,” that is, brought to the world by the authority in-person of the real.

However, tolerance cannot consist in “returning” to a so-called simplicity of “mores,” indeed, returning to a rectitude of “moral judgment” as Kant invites. The ethico-moral doublet is constitutive and cannot be effectively dismembered.

By contrast, it can make the object of a use defined transcendently outside of both morality and ethics and which, no doubt, *will simplify* this doublet— as this is tolerance — but never to the benefit of one of its terms and at the expense of the other.

By limiting the always too spontaneous imputation, tolerance introduces a new distinction that echoes the Kantian distinction between thinking and knowing: to think/ to accuse. It only reprises this distinction to displace it and shuffle the terms and their relation. If the activity of ethics is concentrated in the thoughtless accusation or, at least, in the beyond of knowing (Kant, Levinas), tolerance is concentrated in the transcendental dimension that is globally the dimension of “thought” beyond accusation and the activity of imputation. If, for Kant, for example, we must morally judge what we cannot know, tolerance requires that that in which one cannot know as a phenomenon that one does not need to judge it. Tolerance is therefore not moral skepticism in particular.

Generally, it refuses *the antinomy of accusation*, an antinomy between the dogmatism that believes to access the reality of fault, and the dogmatism that does not believe in this possible access, which also postulates fault but as too remote and inaccessible. Tolerance renounces any hypothesis on responsibility and is limited to the “phenomena” in a now radical sense of the term. It resolves the antinomy without reproducing or reviving it in its own sphere and in itself, as is the case of philosophical type “syntheses.” Tolerance is limited to think and

know fault in the sense where these activities now bear on a simple phenomenon, where fault is now the fault “for” tolerance, transcendently reduced from its “in-itself” by tolerance. Therefore, turning Kant against himself, the point is to use fault, to lead out a transcendental pragmatics of responsibility within the bounds of experience constituted by ethics in the plural, politics in the plural, and ideologies as simple phenomena.

Such that we comprehend it, tolerance is *universal justice*, in particular the justice done to Evil and the Good. It is justice *for* Evil because it refuses to pose a Radical Evil “in-itself” of the mythical and metaphysical (“meta-ethical”) type. It is also the justice *for* the Good because it refuses to let it be lost within a transcendence in the unlimited search for its auto-position, refusing it lose its real identity in the ineffability of an auto-positional identity. Tolerance is the universal transcendental identity that displaces the hierarchy of Good and Evil and emplaces it as simple material that has to make use of. Then what use is to be made of the idea of a “Radical Evil,” more remarkable in philosophy and more enigmatic than the idea of a “Radical Good” which is not interrogated because it goes for the obvious? Within the limits of our problematic, Radical Evil as certain philosophers or religions invoke it in the sense of a supra-intelligible and inaccessible essence cannot be nothing but the mixture of an onto-theo-logy (*Evil as cause being par excellence*), inverted in its traditional form under mythical and archaic constraints and intolerable sufferings. This comprehension is its first reduction and the condition of an intelligence of its unintelligibility. We will avoid saying that tolerance is the phenomenal or real kernel of the metaphysical Good. Here, Evil is the very form of metaphysics broadened, the philosophical auto-position or sufficiency of ethics. This split is not good: the hypothesis is too immediate to be credible with auto-position rather being a universal formal trait of philosophy and ideology. Radical Evil is the mixture of auto-positional sufficiency and the experiences of suffering in the service of which it is set – so that it finally appears within the figures of the Universal Cause – as a meta-physical excess, more exactly, a meta-ethical excess.

For Radical Good and not only Radical Evil are enrooted in this form of sufficiency, therefore in the Ethico-Moral circle or Ethico-Moral Difference, in the general excess of redoubling that is as valid for Evil as much as for Good but does not “empirically” exhaust them.

Said otherwise, what we call “war” which is the “object” of tolerance is not limited to “Radical Evil” spontaneously invoked by morals but is also valid as a meta-morality of both Good and Evil as meta-ethical. It is deeper and more universal than the Radical Evil of philosophies and religions. Tolerance determines a non-ethics and consequently reduces ethics as meta-morality and both Good and Evil as meta-ethical. Within the bounds of tolerance, the phenomenal content of “Radical Evil,” once discharged of its empirical content and reduced to the state of a phenomenon, is no doubt the hubris of auto-position insofar as it is valid for the myth of Radical Good as well. Auto-position is the root of universal war, the real kernel of finally universal Radical Evil that is not opposed to the “Good” and which explains the proliferation of antinomies even in thought, and the universal belief that it is possible and legitimate to philosophically decide on good and evil.

Tolerance and the Refusal to Prescribe

Philosophically grounding norms and prescriptions of any kind is to claim to assure them a seat within the real and, at minimum, an “applicability” if not a validity. However, we have known for

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a longtime that this seat is vain or is nevertheless not a seat, we have known that the foundation participates in that which it grounds and that it is swept in turn into the universal circle of values and the management of values.

Because tolerance does not make a hypothesis of a “foundation” but leaves norms to be given without claiming to intervene in them – there is ethics, this is everything that it is authorized to say – it can also propose a use for it that is no longer a gesture nor a simple requisition at the behest of foreign finalities. As we have examined incessantly, man in his essence and the posture of tolerance that he assumes on this basis represents no finality but the force of constitution of a new order or an emergent sphere in relation to these norms and whose emergence is the surest guarantee against management and requisition. One could say that it concerns a reserved use, a use reserved for man, which does not mean: consumed by man. The use is constituted by tolerance rather than immediately consumed. On the one hand, if there are norms and values, we do not know to what extent they are made by and for man, and it is up to tolerance to determine this. On the other hand, what comes back to man and makes the object of an enjoyment rather than a consumption are not the norms such that they are given on a spontaneous mode in a heteroclitic and contradictory way. This object is what they become under the effect of tolerance which transforms their meaning or use. If the object of tolerance is the norm such that it is given under the sign of contradiction, its effect itself is not a normative type: tolerance does not act like a meta-ethics or a meta-politics, a superior type of legislation and normativity that would redouble the circle of both.

More generally, when it has its cause in the real essence of man, tolerance realizes within its being the strict identity of a theoretical use of ideologies. It is the identity of a pragmatics (which we will see that it nevertheless borrows from ethics or from its specificity as a distinct sphere, for example, of politics, a particular and characteristic element) or a non-normative use by and therefore for man, and a theoretical grasp upon that which, being practical and normative, is not given on the purest theoretical mode. There may be a “theory” (= ethical philosophy) of morals, but tolerance represents an undivided and new *theoretical (use)* of this theory itself. There may be, there certainly is a practical or prescriptive use of these norms, but tolerance represents an undivided and new *theoretical (use)* of this practice. Hence, the impossibility to make the slightest cleaving, the slightest opposition between the normative and the theoretical pass within tolerance.

Finally, tolerance gives an acceptable and rigorous meaning to one of the most insistent and most disastrous slogans of the contemporary reflection on ethics: to refuse to prescribe, above all to not prescribe. Most of the time, this maxim disguises under a cunning and apparently intelligent form a vulgar skepticism and a flat positivism, a moral renouncement towards theory and a theoretical powerlessness ready to complete itself in a sociology of mores. The point is not to renounce prescribing because, in any case, there is prescription, there is prescription rather than simple ascertainment, and because the tenants of this maxim are the first to prescribe anti-prescription and the last – we must hope – to believe in the moral and theoretical pertinence of this slogan. The point is to comprehend otherwise non-prescription by determining the positive content of the non- as tolerance rather than as vulgar nihilism. Non-Prescription is not the primary and first absence of prescription, it is a new relation, more universal than the relation of prescription, of the suspension of prescription or ethical sufficiency, what we can designate as the Principle of Sufficient Prescription that has the auto-position of norms as an object, auto-

prescription as the essence of all ethics and politics in the plural born within the element of philosophy. For tolerance, prescription is nothing but a *datum* that it uses for the enjoyment of man and that, to this end, it deprives of its auto-position, treating it as a material without letting itself be invested by it. Even the categorical imperative, the Kantian form of Duty, is nothing but a material that provides tolerance with a necessary contribution and that it treats by delivering it from its aspect as a rational principle or auto-position. Even “Duty,” even the “Moral Law” and “Good Will” need an immanent use by tolerance to limit their barely human philosophical sufficiency.

Existent-Man-As-A-Stranger as the “Subject” of Tolerance

A new idea of tolerance is obviously not possible except with a new idea of man. Tolerance is a “transcendental” posture in the most general sense, one that means, on the one hand, that it depends on the very authority of the real, and, on the other hand, modifies its meaning or contributes any such predicate susceptible to determine it. Then, what is this real or this subject that sustains tolerance if, otherwise, it must no longer be philosophically definable? Obviously, no philosophically known forms of the being-human cannot assume it, provided the role that we have made it play. Neither would he be the classical and dogmatic, “Leibnizian” “individual” who always expresses the universe, whereas the man of tolerance precisely does not express in their being the total possible of conflicts, and idea that we have even abandoned for the simple identity of a universal a priori of war as the necessary and universal structure of experience; nor would he be the post-modern “superman,” nor the inhuman, nor even *Dasein*, the ones who surmount differends and the business of thought, because the man of tolerance abandons all kinds of “difference” to the circle of the universal-consensus-for-war. If there is one “subject” of tolerance, a necessarily human authority who would be its cause, this subject cannot be “anonymized,” divided and unrealized as all these transcendent exemplars with their lack of humanity, as characteristic of philosophy, are. By contrast, it must be characterized by its nature of indivisible identity without difference nor synthesis, but real and non-ideal.

Said otherwise, if there is a subject of tolerance that determines it without being in turn determined by it, this subject is necessarily a non-Cartesian Ego because it is defined by its non-auto-positional radical immanence (to) itself, and such that this radical immanence defines its nature as an Ego rather than the inverse, which would be Cartesian or other. Or again: an Ego that would no longer be immanent to Substance, Being, Becoming, to whatever position, but (to) itself as “Ego-in-Ego, before any position. The Ego-in-Ego is the real essence of man, distinct from tolerance to the extent where man is the immanent cause of tolerance and tolerance is nothing but transcendental. What we may also call the immanent vision-in-man where vision-in-man is the phenomenal or real kernel of tolerance, from our point of view it is not possible to give tolerance an utterly credible status such that man and man alone, not the individual, or the subject, or the citizen, etc., is not posed as being my “only real being” – an absurd statement – but the real itself excluding the World, Society, History, etc., which are not the real but form the spheres of effectivity doomed to the tribulations of transcendence and Unreality. Paradoxically, perhaps, it is not a matter of a Robinsonade, but the destruction of the Robinsonade.

Up until now, we have described the efficacy of tolerance and its real “subject.” What are their relations?

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The vision-in-Ego and tolerance form an undivided identity (the identity of the Ego, which also passes through, as we have said, tolerance to which it thus gives its actuality or performativity), but a dual identity or an irreducible duality without synthesis because one of the terms is the identity itself of the Ego and the other term is tolerance as force or acting, as a relation to the circle of war. The Ego is absolutely autonomous or concrete, defined by immanence, yet indifferent or ineffective; tolerance is relatively autonomous or abstract and assumes the Ego, yet defined by transcendence, is a relation to the experience (of) war. Consequently, they are two qualitatively heterogenous structures where tolerance is never the property or attribute of an Ego. When they are “read” from the Ego, they rather emerge from an undivided identity without synthesis, therefore, without tolerance – which is nevertheless received and lived-in-the-Ego – determining the Ego as one of its real moments; when they are “read” from tolerance, they constitute a duality, tolerance not confounded with the Ego but in some way forming its other. More than the “secular arm,” tolerance is the transcendental organon – neither secular nor celestial – of man who is nothing but man. We will also definitely renounce assigning tolerance to the old philosophical and quite exhausted “subject” or its Other, the “Other man.” There is no humanity except the humanity of the Ego, but the full, if not complete man is the man (of) tolerance, with the Ego assuming without a distance tolerance or again *the existent-Ego-as-tolerant* and therefore not accidentally exercising a simple psychologico-political property.

This “full” subject, tolerance, is the non-ethical and non-political acting that we are looking for.

The space of the “non-” is tolerance that fills it but is itself, as we have said, if it undoubtedly has some traits of alterity, not the first Other of the post-moderns of the Other of Judaism. It is the Other enrooted in the immanence (of) the Ego. This Other is not another I, but the Other insofar as it emerges from the I-in-I and therefore stops being a void and ideal, dominant and authoritarian entity. Otherwise, as it is not a predicate or an attribute of the subject, tolerance as the relation to war disposes of a specific and original qualitative reality. Although, let us repeat, it is full man who is the undivided duality of the existent-Ego-as-tolerant or as-Other. It is enough to assume the posture not of the alter-ego, or even the Other Man, but of existent-man-as-Other or, as we have also said, existent-man-as-Stranger, so that we realize in our being the actuality of tolerance.

Tolerance is missing one last determination: the specific nature of its aspect as an organon and its acting “upon” conflicts. This cannot be a physical or natural force or a theoretical thought-power, nor a primary force nor a theory of acting. However, it is not an ethical force (conscience, morality, etc.), because it must act “upon” ethics and politics, etc. Nevertheless, its most radical and highest form must rather possess a characteristic trait of ethics but precisely under conditions that are no longer belonging to rational auto-position this time, but of a simple position or reception (Lived-in-Ego) because the Ego-in-Ego, by definition, no longer has the structure of an auto-position. For it is the characteristic of ethics, in opposition to nature, thought or art, to have the primacy of transcendence understood as pure alterity or exteriority that alone acts practically in a sufficient and determinant way as *The Critique of Practical Reason* demonstrates, that is, independently of other aspects of Being, position and unity in particular. The entire if not complete concept of tolerance is therefore a peace(-)power or force-(of)-pacification that has as its specific content the purest and above all the most “simplified,” the

least redoubled or withdrawn, the least possible auto-positional form of exteriority. Tolerance, as an actual and performative identity of exteriority as such, as an original experience, emerges from one tenant alone “in-the-face-of” war and makes it befall as an a priori that is itself without war, making war befall as the a priori of experience. This ultimate aspect makes us better comprehend that tolerance is not a substantial and ready-made principle or a metaphysical entity but must be substituted – as an ontologically *simple* force may be – for the fetishized and reified ethics and politics in the plural, which have become commodities on the economic and media-friendly market of opinions.

Theorem of Tolerance

In what preceded, we came to describe in reality the conditions that make up tolerance, as we have stated, the object of a transcendental theorem rather than a philosophical opinion.

Indeed, tolerance has precise conditions of existence and manifestation: a real condition – the essence of man as Ego-in-Ego or vision-in-man, this is the non-substantial “substratum” of tolerance; and an “empirical” condition – the existence of conflicts characterized by their high degree of abstraction (ideological and philosophical) by their generality with regard to experience, by a certain consensus of peace that is itself for war, which makes up a symptom and a conjuncture. Tolerance is apparently the articulation of man and general war as the two spheres that are first separated and without communication. How do we infer tolerance concretely, giving this inference a rigorous formulation that will make it the object of a genuine theorem? Man, as outside-of-the-war, is a first term that is realistically unthinkable; no ethics or politics at least, no ideology suits man. Even tolerance is not a predicate of the Ego. If, therefore, we nevertheless want to think it (ethically, politically), we must willy-nilly use the existing ideological war of philosophies and ethics and only be able to “add” to this war the posture of tolerance, the one that exceeds the simple Ego that it is, on the basis of its necessary relation to the conflictual substance of spontaneous thought. If the Ego is at first given without an operation of thought or givenness, tolerance, by contrast, is manifest or given as enveloped and marked by war. However, what is exactly given in this way? Not tolerance itself or in its identity which it will precisely receive – and it alone – from the Ego, but that which incarnates it and makes it exist *with regard to war*. This is still a bit more complex. Tolerance itself is presupposed as a specific and original structure that is distinguished both from the Ego – not letting itself be deduced from the Ego (as its becoming, its alienation in war and the War) – and, on the other hand, it is presupposed without nevertheless auto-posing itself as a new transcendent rational principle: it no doubt presupposes (itself) in relation to the Ego and war with which it is not confounded, but depends on the Ego for that which is of its reality, and depends on war for that which is its object or material. However autonomous as a type of posture it may be, tolerance is on the one hand received and lived in-Ego and, on the other hand, incarnated in empirical conditions of existence.

This is because of the double relation that we have called “transcendental” (neither real nor empirical, but each time entertaining an original to the real and the empirical).

Therefore, it assumes on the one hand the hypothesis of the vision-in-man as the real, and the real as not being conflictual, and, on the other hand, the empirical reference to war, and lets itself be inferred from the relation and as the relation of the first to the second.

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This inference is necessary through its cause and contingent through its occasion (war), and, depending on the path followed from one and the other term, it has sides of induction and sides of deduction. It is obviously not empirically inducted from the sole empiricist consideration of conflicts – which does not prove it but even proves the contrary, and then nothing would make it possible to require it. However, it cannot be further deduced from the sole abstract consideration of the Ego, which is indifferent to war, indifferent and not “tolerant” but which, through tolerance, can determine war. By contrast, it is enough to infer it, posing it as tolerance so that the contingency of the philosophical structure of conflicts is changed into the universal a priori of experience and that conflicts would be raised to the benefit of identity because the a priori war, by virtue of its transcendental identity such that we intended it since the beginning, does not mean that the here and there empirically observed war is extended in time and space and simply generalized under the same existing conditions. Concerning the war of all against all as the claim to the real, we will say that it may be inducted occasionally, and from the real outside of conflict, tolerance as an organon (of) peace can be deduced principally.

Far from being a simple of prudence and a pious virtue or principle, tolerance has acquired a transcendental force against ideologies, that is, against ethical and political opinions, even if they were disguised in “theories.” While many ethics close themselves upon the City and the Good, Duty and Value, Liberty and Responsibility like transcendental entities, tolerance inaugurates an absolutely open pragmatic posture. It owes not only to its direct insertion into the human real but just as much to the form that ensues from this real and under which it presents itself: as a hypothesis or as a result of a hypothesis and axioms, as a theorem. As a real or human theorem, a theorem that is a lived experience if we may say so, not psychologically of course but lived in-the-last-instance alone. Therefore, it participates equally in thought and affect, theory and pathos. The theorem is no longer a real-transcendent postulate as philosophical postulates and Kantians one in particular are. It is a scientific type of theorem as much as it is philosophical, or it is one that gives rise to a use of existing norms that identically possesses, as we have suggested, a side of induction and a side of deduction.

A Non-Ethical Creation

Maybe one will suspect a certain formalism in this universality and this plasticity of tolerance. Nevertheless, the form of the Law or Duty is rejected by it in the sphere that is precisely the sphere of data or its objects. The truth is that the real identity is indivisible in form and matter even when it appears with the status of transcendence or a priori. Tolerance radically resolves for its own account this fundamental antinomy of ethics that is the antinomy of “formalism” (Kant) and “materiel ethics” or the phenomenological intuition of values (Scheler). The phenomenon of the Ego-in-Ego excludes form and matter, Reason and intuition, finitude and infinitude, the given and givenness, etc., the modern antinomies – as much as their synthesis, even if it were “transcendental” in the Kantian sense of the word. The only distinctions that are exercised here are the distinctions of unilateral dualities, that is, absolute autonomies (of concrete or independent essences) and relative autonomies (of abstract or dependent essences). And it absolutely crosses all philosophical distinctions and, among those of rationalism as those of phenomenology.

Tolerance therefore does not make up a “number” with ethics or politics in the plural, it is not a supplementary “opinion” nor even the solution to post-modern chaos. This conjuncture is nothing but a very auspicious occasion to better determine it.

The spring of tolerance is a new experience and practice of identity already given as a hypothesis, rather than identity sought as synthesis. Tolerance determines will or reason without carrying out their synthesis, rather preventing it, the synthesis of “rational will,” claiming to interminably auto-pose itself as the real itself by helping itself with transcendent and meta-physical postulates. Tolerance expresses what there is of the most immanent in ethics and politics in the plural but without ever leading to confusions and amphibologies because it acts by proceeding through unilateral, not reciprocal or bilateral, dualities and those that remain constituted by phenomenally heterogeneous orders. These orders are no longer the orders of an opening of finite human reason towards the infinite, in the way of Kant’s noumenal orders, but because this infinite opening is from the outset given following from the essence of man – this is precisely the organon of tolerance – it is the opening for the transcendent spheres of ethics, ideologies, and philosophies that represent the “empirical” side for it.

More generally, tolerance forces us to consider that the closest plural ethics of the “morality of mores,” like the most philosophically elaborated ones, are all spontaneous and treatable as simple opinions, but that they form *de jure* a phenomenally positive a priori doxic sphere; a sphere that is first given in the conflictual state but is precisely pacifiable. Within this programme or this effect, the antinomy of morals and ethics, both violent in their own way, the antinomy that is Ethico-Moral Difference with all its interior exchanges and blends, is “resolved” in a non-philosophical mode by the identity-of-the-last-instance of the philosophical or the ethical and the moral. This resolution obviously supposes that tolerance as a transcendental organon is specified or “modalized” under the kinds of a priori structures – on the one hand, from their internal identity of the style that is non-positional (of) self, extracted by them from the (ethico-)philosophical material and that, on the other hand, it treats in the same way the specifically “moral” or ethico(-philosophical) contents (values, norms, imperatives, practical behaviors, etc.), which will then be the correlates of a priori structures and aprioritic like them.

With his essence retrieved, tolerant man dissolves in general the ethico-transcendental mixtures that philosophical ethics are, with tolerance assuming, for it alone, the utterly relatively autonomous transcendental side and ethics assuming the side of its object. At the end of this process of “dualyzation,” there is this idea that the essence of man is not determinable by ethics, but it is the essence of man that determines ethics. To distinguish this work from the work of humanist slogans, we will willingly forge the term “humanify” and oppose “humanification” of the ethico-political with the biológico-anthropological humanization on the model of which political programmes are erected. Humanification is not a “humanist” principle of Reason and furthermore is not a humanitarian principle of intervention into ethics, for rational principles claim to directly rule experience and legislate on “individuals” always given in natural and social transcendence, whereas tolerance “humanifies” Reason itself and limits the violence of principles. It is possible to speak by similitude of a “principle of tolerance,” but it is not a matter of a new rational principle added to the previous ones which would have sufficiently demonstrated their conflictual and vindicative essence and destined to temper them. Rigorously, tolerance is a transcendental temperament of Reason itself, in no way the temperament that

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Reason would be capable of, or a sort of equilibrium, a sort of principle of compossibilization and “difference” of opposite values.

Compossibilization is a philosophical means of synthesis that attenuates contradictions but by magnifying them *ad infinitum*, it is a baroque principle that does not exceed philosophical sufficiency. By contrast, tolerance does not magnify war, it does not differentiate antinomies, but forces each on their “side” to an intrinsic identity without synthesis, an identity that marks each of them from within and makes them equal to one another all by conserving their specificity (this identity is transcendental alone), preventing their simple leveling and confusion.

Whether tolerance is a determinant force is a barely metaphysical or abstract “thesis” that there will be the eternalization of war-against-war and its solution with the emergence of a transcendent despot or Leviathan, or its possible “immanent” solution. War is nothing but an interminable and insoluble question because philosophy did not know how to pose it as a problem solvable by the hypothesis of tolerance. It is first a problem of real and rigorous thought, and then eventually a problem of theory and practice – and that it had wanted to directly confront, then condemned to piously negate or repress it, to close its eyes halfway or “divert its gaze.” In reality, ethics under all its forms dissimulates or incarnates a philosophy and, for this reason, is in fact comprised as a technology of a superior (“transcendental”) type, a technology of the transformation by norms, rules, or values, objects that are assumed in-themselves of the World and Society – as we have already remarked.

Even the famous “categorical imperative” opposed to the “technical imperative” emerges from the philosophical technology of Reason and the Will. All the ethico-moral mixtures, precisely because they are mixtures, define technological problems rather than problems of thought, that is, here, problems of the identity of the theoretical and the pragmatic.

Do we want to create new values? Do we want to transmute morality? Rather than superseding values and therefore begin by admitting, despite everything, their relevancy, the point is to invalidate them from the outset (only in their “real” claim) from a posture of tolerance, one that does not relate itself to them without requiring them as contributions for a new order. If we admit that the identity-of-the-last-instance of the scientific discovery and technophilosophical invention is creation, then the plural ethics of the recognition of values, like the plural ethics of the creation of values, can be abandoned for the benefit of a non-ethical creation.

Tolerance and Responsibility

Having considered the refusal to seek responsibilities, meta-ethical and hinter-ethical causes, through *ressentiment* from tolerance, it becomes possible on this phenomenal basis to retie tolerance and the problem of responsibility otherwise. The point is to demonstrate that tolerance, ceasing from being a form of responsibility under obedience, is the creative responsibility for norms, ethics and politics as such. And to suggest that its intimate constitution is that of an irresponsible responsibility. If philosophy is incapable of stopping the vicious, mythical and inhuman circle of an abyssal and infinite responsibility, then tolerance alone can give back to responsibility a human figure, even though it appears to further tilt – but no doubt this is an appearance – towards liberty. Responsibility must abandon its nature of auto-position or principle that it has in ethical fetishism in order to acquire a non-ethical form.

Let us pose the philosophical problem of ethics at its extremes, rather than in its median forms. Liberty and responsibility form an ethico-philosophical antinomy: liberty is then assumed from a Greco-philosophical extraction and responsibility assumed from a Judaic extraction, blending each other, limiting each other, and exasperating each other by bringing each other to the extremes. Sometimes liberty grounds responsibility and brings it towards auto-position, and sometimes responsibility affects liberty from an infinite debt and is made the cause of liberty, even the cause of the being-me. This difference is the vastest transcendental horizon of ethics and designates the extreme poles of the problem. Tolerance then seems that it must hold the expected role of the “moderator” of extremes, being if not the law, at least the temperament of their blend. Against the absolutism of the Law as auto-position (Kant) or as prohibited (Levinas), it argues precisely for the necessity of the blend of liberty and responsibility. We can sustain that tolerance is if not the real principle, at least the reason of variation or the gradient of plural ethics located within this framework. However, this intra-ethical concept of tolerance, even if it is regulatory, cannot be our own. To the contrary, qua non-ethical, tolerance is the organon that suspends the Greco-Judaic antinomy and realizes the radical identity, the non-unitary identification (without synthesis into a superior principle or a new ethico-philosophical principle) responsibility and liberty.

1) What is the relation of tolerance to responsibility?

Against the unitary-divided concepts that philosophy provides of responsibility, we will distinguish heterogeneous types:

- a) Through its real essence, the Ego-in-Ego could be described in axioms whose first terms would be taken from ethics, like responsibility (of) the self and (of) the self alone; it is so immanent (to) itself rather than to a transcendent Ego that it would also be an irresponsibility or an undecided responsibility. Through his essence at least, man receives as already-human or rather lets himself be given an absolute responsibility (of) himself that is the non-responsible identity (of) responsibility. However, if responsibility is still treated like an attribute or a predicate, it is better to say that man is the being who has been responsibility without any responsibility having been assigned or recognized to him. Is there no Judaism in this experience of a being-responsible given-without-giveness? The Ego-in-Ego is not responsible in the face of the absence that makes up the Law or the non-presence that makes up the Face. The Ego-in-Ego is responsible (of) itself rather than the Other or the Neighbor. This being-responsible that is from side to side inalienable, equivalent to a non-responsibility insofar, at least, it does not have to be fixed to it and that it has not received it. The vision-in-man cannot be abandoned for any transcendence and above all is not equivalent to a substantialization of responsibility because it is tested (of) self on an immanent and unreflected mode, which avoids the unintelligible being-responsible of Judaism as much as the intelligible yet transcendent being-responsible of a Greek origin.
- b) It is with the organon of tolerance, which supersedes the Ego alone, that the original force appears, of which we may say that it is also responsible in-the-last-instance (of) itself, that is, of what it can do. Not from such and such norm or man defined in social or political transcendence and furthermore not from the Ego-in-Ego itself, but from the possible *use*

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norms – responsible (of) peace. Recall that this use is not an activity exterior to man but man himself or “full” man as the relation to the World or Society. Thus, is deracinated the Judaic vision of responsibility and what subsists of it in modern (Kant) philosophy and post-modern philosophy. The *ethical vision of the world* is a transcendental illusion: the Ego is not *ad infinitum* responsible either for itself as a rational subject or as the other as a hostage-me. Neither is the Me is for Me nor the Me for the Other. The One-for-the-Other makes no sense here.

By contrast, the Other-for-the-Other is the second type of responsibility as an immanent determination of tolerance. The modern humanism of the “subject” and the semi-humanism of the “Other-man” are together displaced with all the philosophico-unitary forms of responsibility into the ethico-philosophical sphere where they become the object or material of a second type of responsibility. It is a dualysis of responsibility that involves the new idea of man, irreducible dualities without synthesis, rather than unitary concepts divided *ad infinitum*.

2) What is the relation of tolerance to liberty?

If liberty is in general this unlimited drive, either this infinite spontaneity or this transcendence by which the Me plunges into the nothing beyond any natural and social determination to finally be posed itself, together with how philosophers conceive it, then liberty here is rather limited radically by and within the Ego; limited by its immanent cause rather than auto-limited. Enrooted within the undecided identity of the real, deprived of auto-position and self-surveilling, liberty is reduced to the simple transcendence of tolerance and stops being set into the service of its own unleashing [*déchaînement*]. If the philosophical tradition ends by making liberty the essence of the real – the essential-form of liberty, that is, the decision or transcendence assumed to be determinant and completes to turn it against man – it is the task of a human “ethics” to reduce it rather to the state of a simple “neighboring” transcendental organon of tolerance itself. Tolerance does not negate liberty not more than the Law. It suspends the Law’s transcendent violence, introducing into this war for war’s sake something of the sweetness and simplicity that the ultimate reduced of the Ego forms and turns liberty towards the protection of itself, rather than towards its affirmation. This transcendental, non-“metaphysical” liberty is by the Me-in-the-last-instance, therefore not affecting in turn the Me or stops constituting its essence. Liberty becomes the instrument of the Me and a neighboring determination of tolerance in the way – if we may use for a moment Spinozist philosophy – of two parallel “attributes” but determined-in-the-last-instance by the Me and “expresses” each of them, the entirety of experience. Therefore, tolerance is not the unitary synthesis of liberty and responsibility. *Here*, from the ethical point of view, tolerance is the first (and not dominant) organon that uses these determinations that, in turn, under other perspectives and with other materials, can be characterized as organons. We will also say that, in the current context or in terms of the conjuncture that we elaborate, tolerance determines-in-the-last-instance the use of liberty and responsibility, reducing their antagonistic philosophical nature as essences which is the state under which tolerance receives them.

Tolerance is a true *decision*, a decision “within” the real itself if it is exercised, on the one hand, as void of the Ego and, on the other hand, as a relative void of norms, values, and opinions; it is a decision “within” the real rather than in the logico-formal void. Tolerance enjoys a relative autonomy and thus, with regard to man, acquires a specificity and an irreducibility to the

structure of the Ego. Philosophy itself begins by opening substance with the introduction of postulates within thought, but it is an opening on the basis of its prime closure, not the opening of tolerance that precedes the very principles of Reason.

For example, the point is not only to replace the rational fact and obedience (Kant) through the auto-positional project and liberty (Fichte), but to replace the project itself through the identically theoretical and practical axiom and theorem (and therefore non-theoretical and non-practical if “theory” and “practice” are understood in their philosophical senses).

It is only the vision-in-man as determinant-in-the-last-instance, not Reason, but the use of Reason, that can creatively open the project of liberty.